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TAX STATUS: EMPLOYEE VS. INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR AND EMPLOYEE VS. PARTNER
Kurt L.P. Lawson 1
William & Mary Tax Conference
November 11,2016
I.

OVERVIEW

Employees and employers face substantially different treatment from sole proprietors,
partners and other independent contractors and their clients under a wide range of laws,
including federal and state employment tax, income tax and labor laws. This outline describes
some major differences in treatment between employees and employers on the one hand and
independent contractors and their clients on the other, the factors used to distinguish between
them under selected state and federal statutes, and the processes for making these determinations.

II.

FEDERAL TAX LAW
A.

Differences in Treatment

1.

Employment Taxes

Social Security and Medicare. Compensation paid to employees is subject to Social
Security and Medicare taxes, if at all, under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA").
By contrast, compensation paid to independent contractors generally is subject to Social Security
and Medicare taxes, if at all, under the Self-Employment Contributions Act ("SECA").
Since 1990, the combined tax rates on employees and their employers on the one hand and
independent contractors and their clients on the other have been virtually identical under both
FICA and SECA. 2 Before 1983, the tax rates on independent contractors were substantially
lower, even though they were generally eligible for the same Social Security and Medicare
benefits as employees. Legislation in 1983 mostly eliminated the rate differential effective in
1984, and made other conforming changes that became fully effective in 1990.

1

Partner, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington, DC.

2

The combined Social Security and Medicare tax rate is the same (15.3%) under both. Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 ("Code") §§ 1401, 31 01 & 3111. Under both, only the first $118,500 of compensation (in 20 16) is
subject to Social Security tax, while the entire amount is subject to Medicare tax. Special deductions also are
provided to self-employed individuals subject to SECA, which produce substantially the same effect as the fact that
employees are not subject to income or FICA taxes on the employer's share of FICA. Code§§ 164(f) &
1402(a)(12).
Since 2013, an additional 0.9% Medicare tax has been imposed on self-employment income and wages that
exceed certain thresholds ($250,000 in the case of taxpayers filing joint returns). The regulations allow an employer
to disregard an employee's actual filing status and wages received from other employers in determining its
withholding obligation. Also since 2013, a 3.8% tax has been imposed on the net investment income of individuals,
estates and trusts that exceeds certain thresholds. Code § 1411. The tax was designed to parallel the uncapped
Medicare portion of FICA and SECA taxes (which total3.8% when the new 0.9% smiax is included).

© 20 16 Kurt L.P. Lawson

Some differences still remain, however. h1 some cases they are substantial. For example,
unlike a contribution on behalf of a common-law employee, a contribution to a qualified plan on
behalf of an independent contractor may not be deducted in computing the independent
contractor's SECA income. 3 On the other hand, trade or business expenses may be deducted
from compensation before SECA compensation is calculated, but cam10t be so deducted for
FICA purposes.

In computing FICA taxes on a new employee's wages, an employer generally may not
take into account the fact that the employee ah·eady has received wages in excess of the taxable
wage base from another employer. 4 If this results in an overpayment, the employee may be
entitled to a refund, but not the employer. 5 This result can be avoided if the employers are
affiliated and use a "common paymaster." 6 However, the common paymaster mle is available
solely to affiliated corporations (including nonprofits), and therefore is not available to affiliated
partnerships or LLCs taxed as partnerships. This is particularly unfortunate since many
partnerships and LLCs are patis of larger groups of partnerships and LLCs, and their employees
often perform services for other entities that are pati of the group.
FICA wages of an employee-shareholder of a corporation are limited to amounts
distributed to him as compensation, even if the corporation is an S corporation, 7 whereas the
SECA income of a general patiner generally includes his entire distributive share of patinership
income. 8 The employment tax treatment of a limited partner is similar to the employment tax
treatment of an employee-shareholder. 9 Specifically, it includes only guaranteed payments

3

Code§ 1402(a); GCM 39807 (Jan. 16, 1990); cf LaFlamme v. Comm 'r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1201 (2012)
(self-employed taxpayer may deduct contribution to pension plan when calculating income tax liability, but not
when calculating self-employment tax liability). Accident and health plan contributions are included in SECA
compensation even though they are deductible for income tax purposes. (The Small Business Jobs Act of2010
allowed self-employed individuals to deduct health insurance costs in determining self-employment income,
effective for calendar year 2010 only.)
4

Treas. Reg.§ 31.3121(a)(l)-1(a)(3).

5

Code§ 6413(b); Treas. Reg.§ 31.6413(c)-1;Rev. Rul. 55-584, 1955-2 C.B. 394.

6

Code§ 3121(s); Treas. Reg.§ 31.3121(s)-1.

7

Rev. Rul. 59-221, 1959-1 C.B. 225. If actual wage payments are low relative to the value of the services
being provided, but dividends are high, the IRS might seek to recharacterize some of the dividends as wages. See, e.g.,
Rev. Rul. 74-44, 1974-1 C.B. 287; David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States, 668 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 364 (2012); Dunn & Clark, P.A. v. Comm 'r, 57 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 1995); Spicer Accounting, Inc. v. United
States, 918 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1990); Joseph Radtke, S.C. v. Comm 'r, 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1990). If, on the other
hand, wages are too high to leave enough funds to provide an adequate return to the shareholders, the IRS might seek to
recharacterize some of the wages as dividends. See Brinks Gilson & Liane P. C. v. Comm 'r, T.C. Memo. 2016-20 (Feb.
10, 2016).
8
Code§ 1402(a); Treas. Reg.§§ 1.1402(c)-1 & 1.1402(a)-2(d); Ding v. Comm 'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 708
(1997), aff'd, 200 F.3d 587 (9th Cir. 1999); Rev. Rul. 59-221, 1959-1 C.B. 225.
9

Code§ 1402(a)(13).
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described in Section 707(c) 10 that he or she receives for services, and not on his or her entire
distributive share of partnership income.
In 1997 the Intemal Revenue Service (the "IRS") issued proposed regulations 11 that
would have made the employment tax treatment of limited partners and LLC members who
participate in the management of the entity more consistent with the employment tax treatment
of general partners. The regulations also would have clarified when members of an LLC are
treated as general or limited partners. The regulations were vilified as a "stealth tax," and later
that year Congress prohibited the IRS from finalizing the regulations any time before July 1,
1998.
The moratorium has since lapsed. In the absence of guidance, LLCs taxed as partnerships
have had to find their own way, and many have concluded that LLC members generally may be
treated as limited partners. The IRS has said that an individual may be a limited partner only if
he is a partner in an entity f01med under a state limited partnership law. 12 However, it also has
said that whether LLC members are limited partners depends on their involvement in the
management of the business. 13 For several years, the President's budget proposal has included a
provision imposing SECA tax on the distributive shares of owners of S corporations, limited
partnerships, general partnerships, and LLCs taxed as partnerships if they materially patiicipate
in the business. 14 The courts have emphasized the same factors. 15
Unemployment Insurance. The first $7,000 of wages paid to an employee generally is
subject to tax under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act ("FUTA"). Under the integrated
federal/state system, part of the tax is ordinarily paid to the state of employment, while part is

10

Unless otherwise indicated, all references in the text to sections are to sections of the Code.

11

Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1402(a)-2, 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (Jan. 13, 1997).

12

See, e.g., PLR 9525058 (March 28, 1995); PLR 9432018 (May 16, 1994); 2015 Instructions for Form
1065, page 2.
13
See, e.g., ILM 201436049 (May 20, 2014) ("Partners perform extensive investment and operational
management services for the partnership in their capacity as partners (i.e., acting in the manner of self-employed
persons) and Management Company derives its income described in§ 702(a)(8) from the investment management
services performed by Partners. [Therefore, the] income earned by Partners through Management Company is not
income which is basically of an investment nature of the smi that Congress sought to exclude from self-employment
tax when it enacted the predecessor to§ 1402(a)(13)."); CCA 201640014 (June 15, 2016) (individual who was the
operating manager, president, and CEO of a partnership that operated restaurants was not a "limited partner"
because he was "the only partner of Partnership involved with the business and is not a mere investor, but rather
actively participates in the partnership's operations and perform[ed] extensive executive and operational
management services for Partnership in his capacity as a partner).
14

See, e.g., The Treasury Department's Office of Tax Policy's General Explanations of the
Administration's Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals (Feb. 2016).
15

Compare Norwood v. Comm 'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1642 (2000) ("A limited partnership must be created in
the form prescribed by State law."), with Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver LLP v. Comm 'r, 136 T.C. 137 (2011)
(limited partners are those who "lack management powers but enjoy immunity fi·om liability for debts of the
partnership"), and Riether v. United States, 919 F. Supp.2d 1140 (D.N.M. 2012) (citing Renkemeyer).

3
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paid to the federal government; the combined rate is 6%. 16 The federal portion of the tax is paid
quarterly. Independent contractors are not subject to FUTA tax, but likewise generally are not
eligible to receive any unemployment benefits. 17

2.

Income Taxes

Collection Mechanisms. Income taxes on employees are collected mainly through the
withholding system, whereas income taxes on independent contractors are collected mainly
through the estimated tax system. Both systems are backed up by information reporting
requirements imposed on service-recipients. Unless ce1iain exceptions apply, both employees
and independent contractors must pay their estimated income tax liabilities for the current year in
quarterly installments throughout the year. Because of withholding, however, employees
generally do not have to make any estimated tax payments. That is because withholding
generally requires earlier payments than would be necessary under the estimated tax system, and
these amounts are credited towards employees' estimated tax obligations. Thus, employees
generally are required to make estimated tax payments only if they have substantial non-wage
mcome.
Partnerships and LLCs taxed as pminerships might be able to "withhold" income taxes
for their pminers and members, despite the lack of a legal requirement, by paying estimated taxes
on their behalf and reducing their other compensation accordingly. State wage payment laws
generally apply only to employees, so no special electionmles need to be followed. One
downside of this approach is that the arr-angement is not treated as actual wage withholding for
purposes of the various Code provisions that are designed to ensure that the individual gets credit
for the withheld amounts 18 and that they are, in fact, paid over to the IRS. 19 The IRS also has the
authority to allow voluntary withholding arr-angements under Section 3402(p) to be extended to
non-wage payments, 20 although so far it has not done so for payments to pminers or LLC
members. (Triggering backup withholding under Section 3406 is not an option because
compensation reported on Form K -1 is not a "repmiable payment" under that provision.)
Employers generally must repmi all wages paid to an employee annually on Form W -2.
Similarly, clients generally must repmi all compensation paid to an independent contractor
annually on Form 1099-MISC; no Fonn 1099-MISC generally is required, however, for
payments to a corporation (unless the corporation provides medical, health care, or legal
services, or is involved in billing and collecting payments with respect to medical and health care
16

Code§§ 3301 & 3306(b).

17

Eligibility generally is a matter of state rather than federal law.

18

See Code§§ 3l(a)(l) (amount withheld by an employer as tax fi·om an employee's wages "shall be allowed
to the recipient of the income as a credit" against his or her income tax liability for that year) and 6513(b )(1) (employee
deemed to have paid tax on April 15th following close of the tax year only when tax has been "actually deducted and
withheld at the source"); Treas. Reg. § 1.31-1(a) (credit available only "[i]fthe tax has actually been withheld at the
source").
19

See, e.g., Code§ 6672 (the "responsible person" penalty).

20

See Treas. Reg.§ 31.3402(p)-l, 78 Fed. Reg. 71476 (Nov. 29, 2013).
4
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services), payments that are not made by a business, or payments to a service-provider that
aggregate less than $600 in a calendar year.
Forms W-2 must be sent to the employee and to the Social Security Administration. The
Social Security Administration subsequently sends information from the forms to the IRS. In
addition, the employee is required to attach Forms W-2 that he or she receives to his or her
income tax return. Using this information, the IRS can determine whether wages have been
under-repmied. While Forms 1099-MISC must be sent to the independent contractor and the
IRS, there is no requirement that they be attached to the individual's income tax return.
The same penalties generally apply to failures to file or provide an accurate and timely
Form W-2 as apply to failures to file or provide an accurate, complete and timely Fmm 1099MISC.21
Although they are similar, generally more infmmation must be reported on Fonn W -2
than on Fmm 1099-MISC. For example, employers that provide health plans for their employees
must report the value of the coverage under the plans on the employees' Forms W-2. 22

3.

Trade or Business Expense Deductions

Independent contractors face somewhat fewer restrictions on their ability to deduct trade
or business expenses than do employees.
Independent contractors' trade or business expenses generally are deductible "above-theline," i.e., as a direct reduction in their business income reported on Schedule C. 23 Employees'
trade or business expenses, by contrast, generally are deductible only "below-the-line," i.e., as
itemized expenses. In addition, employees' trade or business expenses generally are deductible
only to the extent that these expenses (plus any other miscellaneous itemized deductions) exceed
2% of the employee's adjusted gross income from all sources. The 2% floor does not apply to an
employee's trade or business expenses to the extent that these expenses are reimbursed by his or
her employer tax-free under an "accountable plan"; to be an "accountable plan," the plan must
require the employee to account to the employer for any expenditures and return any excess. 24

21

Code §§ 6721-22. The penalties generally are $260 for each incorrect, incomplete or untimely Form W -2 or
1099-MISC, which is increased to I 0% of the amount that is not correctly reported if the failure is due to "intentional
disregard" of the correct information reporting requirement.
22

See Code§ 605l(a)(l4); see also Notice 2010-69,2010-44 I.R.B. 576; Notice 2011-28,2011-16 I.R.B.
656; Notice 2012-9,2012-4 I.R.B. 315.
23
See Quintanilla v. Comm 'r, T.C. Memo. 2016-5 (Jan. 7, 2016) (a production worker on TV commercials
was an independent contractor and therefore could deduct business expenses on Schedule C without regard to the
2% floor).
24

Code§ 62(c); Treas. Reg.§ 1.62-2; cf Treas. Reg.§ 1.132-5(a)(l)(v) (similar mles for workingcondition fringe benefits).
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Unlike independent contractors, employees may not deduct interest expenses incuned in
their trade or business of being an employee: such interest is considered a personal expense. 25
Home office expenses and rental and depreciation expenses associated with "listed
property" are subject to special deduction limits unless these expenses meet ce1iain business use
requirements. 26 The limits for employees and independent contractors generally are the same
except that, in the case of home office expenses, the employee's business use also must be "for
the convenience of the employer,'m and, in the case oflisted property such as home computers,
such use must be "for the convenience of the employer and required as a condition of
employment. " 28 These standards are difficult for many employees to meet. 29
For purposes of the alternative mininmm tax, miscellaneous itemized deductions are an
adjustment item. 30 Trade or business expenses are a miscellaneous itemized deduction for
employees. Accordingly, for purposes of the alternative minimum tax, trade or business expenses
are not deductible for employees but are deductible for independent contractors.

4.

Qualified Plans

For the most pmi, the mles governing qualified plans are the same regardless of whether
employees or independent contractors pmiicipate in the plan. However, several noteworthy
differences remain.

Independent Contractors Generally. As a plan qualification matter, independent
contractors may not pmiicipate in plans maintained by their clients. 31 They may, however,
pmiicipate in plans they maintain for themselves and their employees, because they are treated as
employees of their own trades or businesses. 32
Consistent with this, contributions to a qualified plan of an independent contractor on
behalf of that individual are not deductible to the extent that they exceed the earned income of

25

Code§ 163(h)(2)(A).

26

See generally Code §§ 280A & 280F. Generally, in the case of a home office, the space must be used
exclusively on a regular basis as the taxpayer's principal place of business. In the case of listed property, the
prope1ty must be used predominantly in the taxpayer's trade or business.
27

See Code§ 280A(c)(l).

28

See Code§ 280F(d)(3)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.280F-6T(a)(2).

29

See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 86-129, 1986-2 C.B. 48. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's "principal place of
business" test also has made it difficult for independent contractors to establish their home office as their principal
place of business if they render services elsewhere. See Soliman v. Comm 'r, 506 U.S. 168 (1993); Rev. Rul. 94-24,
1994-1 C.B. 87.
3

°Code§ 55(b).

31

Code§ 401(a); Rev. Rul. 70-411, 1970-2 C.B. 91; Professional & Executive Leasing, Inc. v. Comm 'r, 89
T.C. 225 (1987), a.ff'd, 862 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1988); cf Rev. Proc. 2002-21,2002-1 C.B. 911 (plans maintained by
professional employer organizations for the benefit ofworksite employees of their clients will be disqualified unless
they are terminated or converted into multiple employer plans).
32

See Code § 40 I ( c)(2)(A)(i); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1 0( c)(1 ).
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the individual from the trade or business with respect to which the plan is established. 33 "Earned
income" for this purpose generally means the individual's net earnings from self-employment for
SECA purposes from the trade or business, minus the contributions themselves. 34 Because the
plan contributions themselves reduce "earned income," an algebraic fmmula is necessary to
ensure that the contribution amount for an independent contractor is not in excess of earned
income. Similar calculation problems exist for compensation definitions based on the definition
of earned income, including the Section 415 and Section 414( s) definitions of compensation,
which are used for purposes of qualified plan discrimination testing and the limits on
contributions to qualified plans. 35
In addition, contributions to the qualified plan that are used to purchase life, accident,
health or other insurance for the independent contractor are not deductible. 36

Elective and Matching Contributions. For plan years beginning before January 1, 1998,
any matching contributions to a pminer covered by a Section 401(k) plan were treated as elective
defenals by the partner for purposes of the limit on elective deferrals under Section 402(g) and
the non-discrimination requirements of Section 40l(k)(3). 37 This rule was reversed by statute in
1997. Despite the change, partners are still able to deduct matching contributions made to a
qualified plan on their behalf under Treas. Reg. § 1.404(e)-1A(f)(1). The same rules probably
apply to members of an LLC taxed as a partnership.
Because, for qualified plan purposes, a partnership is considered to be the employer of
each of its partners, a partner may not, on his own, establish a qualified plan with respect to his
services to the pminership. 38 The same rule probably also applies to members of an LLC taxed as
a partnership.

Employer Securities. Subject to certain limitations, a retirement plan sponsored by a
corporation may hold securities of the sponsoring corporation. 39 However, a retirement plan
sponsored by a partnership probably may not hold any non-debt securities of the partnership
(such as profits or capital interests), even if the patinership is publicly traded or elects to be taxed
as a "C" corporation. 40 The same rule probably also applies to LLCs taxed as partnerships.

33

Code § 404(a)(8).

34

Code§ 401(c)(2).

35

Code§ 415(c)(3)(B); see Treas. Reg.§§ 1.414(s)-1(b)(3) & 1.401(a)(17)-1(b)(6), Examples 4 & 5.

36

Code§ 404(a)(8), (e); Treas. Reg.§ 1.404(e)-1A(g).

37

Code§ 402(g), as amended by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, § 1501.

38

Treas. Reg.§ 1.401-10(e)(1); Rev. Rul. 68-176, 1968-1 C.B. 168; Rev. Rul. 67-3, 1967-1 C.B. 94.

39

ERISA § 407.

40

A plan may not acquire or hold an employer security unless it is a "qualifying employer security," and a
capital or profits interest in a partnership qualifies only if the interest is publicly traded and the partnership was an
existing partnership as of the effective date of the Revenue Act of 1987. ERISA§ 407(a), (d)(5). Debt securities will
qualify only if they qualify as "marketable obligations" under ERISA§ 407(e). Cf PTCE 2004-07, 69 Fed. Reg.

7
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Separation from Service. There are no clear standards for determining when a partner or
member of an LLC has had a "severance from employment" that entitles him to a distribution under
a tax-qualified plan. 41
5.

Welfare and Fringe Benefit Plans

Health Plans. Independent contractors cannot exclude from gross income the value of
employer-provided health plan coverage because Sections 105 and 106 apply solely to coverage
provided to an employee. They cannot even do so under plans they maintain for themselves,
because there is no mle similar to the one in the qualified plan context treating them as
employees of their own trades or businesses for this purpose. If a corporation elects to be taxed
as a Subchapter S corporation and his or her ownership interest in the corporation exceeds 2%,
he or she will be treated as a pminer for purposes of these and other "fringe benefit" provisions
of the Code. 42
Instead of an exclusion, independent contractors are allowed to deduct the amount they
pay for health insurance for themselves and their families, but generally only if (1) they are not
eligible to pmiicipate in any other tax-subsidized health plan, and (2) if they are partners or 2% S
corporation shareholders the partnership or corporation either pays the premiums directly or
reimburses the pminer or shareholder for the premiums, and the payments are treated as
guaranteed payments (in the case of a pa1iner) or wages (in the case of a shareholder). 43 Health
insurance for this purpose can include coverage under a self-insured plan if it exhibits the
appropriate degree ofrisk-shifting. 44 Based on a technical reading of Sections 104(a)(3) and
105(e), the IRS previously took the position that amounts received under a self-insured accident

23220 (April 28, 2004) (permitting retirement plans sponsored by "trust" REITs to offer participants the ability to
invest in REIT shares even though they might not be qualifying employer securities).
41

Cf Treas. Reg.§ 1.409A-1(f)(2)(i) ("An independent contractor is considered to have a separation from
service with the service recipient upon the expiration of the conh·act (or in the case of more than one conh·act, all
contracts) under which services are peiformed for the service recipient if the expiration constitutes a good-faith and
complete temlination of the conh·actual relationship. An expiration does not constitute a good faith and complete
termination of the conh·actual relationship if the service recipient anticipates a renewal of a contrachml relationship or the
independent contractor beconling an employee.").
42

Code§ 1372. For tllis purpose, employee fringe benefits include most employee benefits other than pension
benefits. See, e.g.,Durando v. United States, 70 F.3d 548,551 (9th Cir. 1995); Rev. Rul. 91-26, 1991-1 C.B. 184.
43

Code§ 162(l)(l)(A); Notice 2008-1,2008-2 I.R.B. 251; CCA 200524001 (May 17, 2005); see FSA 3042
(Dec. 19, 1995) (cafeteria plan is tax-subsidized for this purpose). The deduction may not exceed the taxpayer's
earned income from the trade or business with respect to which the plan is established. Code§ 162(7)(2)(A).
44

Section 162(1) clearly covers self-insured arrangements, and, in the IRS's view, the presence of riskshifting is the touchstone of insurance for this purpose. Compare PLR 9814023 (Dec. 23, 1997) with PLR
200007025 (Nov. 19, 1999). However, it is not clear whether it can include coverage under a mere reimbursement
arrangement such as a health flexible spending account ("FSA"), even if the FSA complies with the uniform
coverage requirement, the "use-it-or-lose-it" rule, and other requirements in the proposed cafeteria plan regulations
which are designed to make FSAs more like insurance.

8
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and health plan must be included in gross income, even if taxpayer paid for the coverage
himself. 45 This position was reversed by statute effective January 1, 1997. 46
The IRS takes the position that benefits, such as the payment of accident and health
insurance premiums, that are provided to a partner without regard to partnership income for
services performed in his capacity as a partner are "guaranteed payments" subject to Section
707(c). Section 707(c) treats a guaranteed payment as a payment by the partnership to someone
who is not a partner, but solely for purposes of Sections 61 and 162. Therefore, the IRS takes the
position that such benefits are deductible by the partnership as a compensation expense under
Section 162 and are included in the partner's gross income under Section 61, but that (consistent
with the generalmle explained above) the benefits may not be excluded from the partner's gross
income under any of the provisions of the Code excluding employee benefits fi·om gross income,
even though such provisions could be viewed as aspects of the definition of gross income in
Section 61. 47 Additionally, because the FICA exclusions for employee benefits do not apply, and
because there generally are no comparable SECA exclusions, such benefits are included in
SECA income as well. 48 The same mles probably also apply to members of an LLC taxed as a
partnership.
The same eligibility mles apply to employees and independent contractors with respect to
Health Savings Accounts ("HSAs"). The IRS has said that contributions to HSA that are
provided to a partner without regard to partnership income for services performed in his capacity
as a partner are either "guaranteed payments" subject to Section 707(c) or distributions. 49
Independent contractors are not entitled to employer-provided benefits under the
"employer mandate" in Section 4980H. The IRS has interpreted that provision to apply solely to
common-law employees. The specialmle for 2% shareholders of S corporations applies for this
purpose, as well. 50
Section 36B makes a health insurance premium tax credit available to certain low-income
individuals, including independent contractors who might be eligible to deduct the premiums
under Section 162(7). Adjusted gross income is necessary to compute the premium tax credit, but
the§ 162(7) deduction reduces adjusted gross income, creating a circular relationship. The IRS

45

See PLR 9320004 (Feb. 5, 1993).

46

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, § 311 (b). The amendment added the
language "or through an arrangement having the effect of accident or health insurance" to Code § 104(a)(3).
47

Treas. Reg.§ 1.707-1(c); Rev. Rul. 91-26, 1991-1 C.B. 184; Notice 2005-8,2005-4 I.R.B. 368.

48

Some taxpayers take the position that health benefits provided by a partnership can be excluded from
partners' SECA income as Code§ 132(d) "working condition fringe benefits" to the extent that they would have
been deductible at the individual level under Code § 162(1).
49

See Notice 2005-8, 2005-4 I.R.B. 368.

50

Treas. Reg.§ 54.4980H-1(a)(15).
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has issued guidance, including safe harbor calculation methods, to use in resolving this
circularity. 51
Other welfare andji-inge benefits. Independent contractors cannot participate in a
cafeteria plan, since all participants in a cafeteria plan must be common-law employees. 52 In
addition, independent contractors cannot exclude from gross income the value of group te1m life
insurance under Section 79, 53 meals and lodging expenses fumished for the convenience of the
employer under Section 119, 54 transportation fringe benefits under Section 132(f), 55 or qualified
moving expense reimbursements under Section 132(g).
On the other hand, independent contractors generally can exclude fi:om gross income
benefits received under an education assistance program, 56 dependent care benefits under Section
129 (unless provided through a cafeteria plan), 57 no-additional-cost services and employee
discounts under Section 132(c), working-condition fringe benefits under Section 132(d), 58 and de
minimis fringe benefits under Section 132(e). 59

6.

Nonqualified Plans

Subject to some noteworthy exceptions, incentive and defened compensation plans and
anangements maintained by partnerships and LLCs taxed as partnerships generally are subject to
the same rules as plans and anangements maintained by "C" corporations.
Golden parachute restrictions. The golden parachute rules, which disallow a deduction
for and impose a 20% excise tax on certain "excess parachute payments," generally do not apply
to payments made by a partnership or LLC. This is because the rules apply solely to payments to
individuals providing services to a "corporation" that are contingent on a change in ownership of

51

Treas. Reg.§§ 1.36B-4T(a)(3)(iii) & 1.162(1)-lT; Rev. Proc. 2014-41,2014-33 I.R.B. 364.

52

Code§ 125(d)(l)(A).

53

Treas. Reg. § 1.79-0(b).

54
See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 376 F.2d 280, 296 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Comm 'r v. Moran, 236 F.2d 595,
598 (8th Cir. 1956); Comm'rv. Robinson, 273 F.2d 503,504-05 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 810 (1960);
Rev. Rul. 53-80, 1953-1 C.B. 62. The rationale for these cases and revenue ruling is that a partnership is not a
separate entity from the individual partners, and therefore a partner cannot be an employee of the partnership for
purposes of the "convenience of the employer" test in Code§ 119. Compare Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F.2d 661
(5th Cir. 1968) (remanding to district comi to determine whether a partner can function as an employee for purposes
of Code§ 119, in view of Code§ 707(a)).
55

Code § 132(f)(5)(E).

56
Code§ 127(a). Code§ 127(c)(2) treats self-employed individuals (as defined under Code§ 401(c)(l)) as
employees, although no more than 5% of the benefit under the program may be paid to employees who own greater
than 5% of the stock or capital or profits interest in the employer. Code§ 127(b)(3).

57

Code§ 129(a). Code§ 129(e)(3) treats self-employed individuals (as defined under Code§ 40l(c)) as
employees, although no more than 25% of the benefit under the program may be paid to employees who own greater
than 5% of the stock or capital or profits interest in the employer. Code§ 129(d)(4).
58

Treas. Reg. § 1.132-1 (b )(1 ), (2).

59

Treas. Reg.§ 1.132-l(b)(4).
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the corporation. 60 "Corporation" for this purpose means an entity classified as a corporation or a
publicly traded partnership. 61 Note that in determining whether the golden parachute rules apply
to payments by a corporation, payments from related partnerships and LLCs might have to be
taken into account. 62
Limit on deductible compensation. The $1 million dollar limit on deductible
compensation does not apply to payments by a partnership or LLC. 63 The exception for a
partnership applies even if the partnership is publicly traded. 64
Qualified stock options. The rules establishing favorable tax treatment for the holders of
incentive stock options ("ISOs") and participants in employee stock purchase plans generally do
not apply to interests or options for interests in a partnership or LLC because the rules apply
solely to arrangements involving "stock" in a "corporation." 65 "Corporation" for this purpose
means an entity classified as a corporation or a publicly traded partnership. 66 Employees of an
LLC that is a subsidiary of a corporation may not receive ISOs or options under an employee
stock purchase plan from the corporation since they are not employees of a corporate subsidiary.
(Presumably this would not be true if the LLC were wholly owned by the corporation and thus
its separate existence were disregarded for tax purposes.)
Section 83. Most benefits practitioners assume that the usual rules in Section 83 that
govern the taxation of individuals receiving restricted stock or nonstatutory stock options in
connection with the performance of services for a corporation, also govern the taxation of
individuals receiving interests in, or options with respect to interests in, a partnership or LLC in
connection with the performance or services for the partnership or LLC. 67 Courts seem to
agree. 68

Assuming that Section 83 (or principles similar to those in Section 83) govern, the
difference between the current value of the interest and the amount that the individual pays for

°Code§ 280G(b)(2)(A), (c).

6

61

Treas. Reg.§ 1.280G-1, Q&A-45.

62

See, e.g., Treas. Reg.§ 1.280G-1, Q&A-10.

63

Code§ 162(m)(1).

64

See PLR 200837024 (May 30, 2008); PLR 200614002 (Dec. 14, 2005); PLR 199915036 (April16,

65

Code§§ 422(b), 423(a); Treas. Reg.§ 1.421-7(d).

66

Treas. Reg.§ 1.421-1(i)(l).

1999).

67

However, it is not 100% clear that assumption is correct. Subchapter K has its own rules governing the
admission of new partners. Under those rules, the admission of a new partner generally does not result in the
immediate recognition of income by the pattner unless he contributes no property to the partnership but nevertheless
receives a capital interest, in which case he is taxed on the fair market value of the interest under Code § 61, either at
the time the interest is transferred if the transfer is for past services or at the time the services are rendered if the
transfer is for future services. The time when the income is realized also depends on all of the facts and
circumstances. Treas. Reg. § 1. 721-1 (b)(1 ).
68

See, e.g., Crescent Holdings, LLCv. Comm'r, 141 T.C. No. 15 (Dec. 2, 2013).
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the interest is included in the individual's gross income when the interest is transfened or, if
later, when the interest vests. Also, as in the case of a transfer of stock, under Section 83(h) the
partnership or LLC is entitled to deduct the amount that is included in the individual's income.
Similarly, as in the case of a transfer of unvested stock, the individual may make an election
under Section 83(b) to include the value ofthe interest in income before it vests, so as to "lock
in" the value of the interest that must be characterized as ordinary income while the amount is
still low. Finally, as in the case of a nonqualified stock option, the grant of an option to purchase
an interest in a partnership or LLC generally is not a taxable event unless the option itself is
publicly traded. 69
However, even assuming that Section 83 govems, some variations and special
considerations clearly exist under cunent law with respect to compensatory transfers of
partnership or LLC interests. Of particular interest:
•

If an individual receives a profits interest in exchange for services to a partnership in a
partner capacity or in anticipation of becoming a partner, the IRS will not treat the receipt
of such an interest as a taxable event for the individual or the partnership, unless (i) the
interest relates to a "substantially certain and predictable stream of income from
partnership assets, such as income from high-quality debt securities or a high-quality net
lease," (ii) within two years of receipt, the partner disposes of the profits interest, or
(iii) the partnership is publicly traded.7°

•

It is not clear whether the IRS's position is based on the conclusion that a mere profits
interest is not the kind of "property" to which Section 83 applies, that a profits interest is
property but has no ascertainable value, or that Section 83 does not apply to transactions
of this smt and whatever other rule applies does not require taxation.

•

An unvested interest is treated as received on the date of grant, and thus its status as a
profits interest for this purpose is tested at that time, as long as the pattnership and the
individual treat the individual as the owner of the interest from the date of its grant and
the individual takes into account the distributive share of pmtnership income, gain, loss,
deduction, and credit associated with that interest in computing the individual's income
tax liability for the entire period during which the individual has the interest, and the
patinership and its pmtners do not take a deduction for the fair market value of the
interest. 71

69
This is because only options with "readily ascertainable values" are Code § 83 property and the IRS
interprets readily ascertainable very narrowly. Code § 83(e)(3), (4); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b).
70

Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343. A profits interest is one that would give the holder no share of the
proceeds if the partnership's assets were sold at fair market value and then the proceeds were distributed in a
complete liquidation of the pattnership.Id.; cf Notice 2005-43,2005-24 I.R.B. 1221. Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-1(b) was
revised in 2004 to make it easier to book-up other pmtners' capital accounts immediately before the admission of a
new partner, to ensure (if desired) that what the new pmtner receives is a profits interest.
71

Rev. Proc. 2001-43,2001-34 I.R.B. 191. CCA 2013071210312415 (July 12, 2013) notes that Rev. Proc.
93-27 and Rev. Proc. 2001-43 might not apply to profits interests that are "received in an employee capacity." The
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Section 409A. Section 409A requires all amounts defened under a nonqualified deferred
compensation plan after December 31, 2004 (including earnings on those amounts) to be
included in income to the extent they are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture and have
not previously been included in income unless the plan complies, both in form and in operation,
with ce1iain rules regarding the timing of deferral elections and the timing of payouts and payout
elections. If these rules are violated, the service-provider also must pay interest at the IRS
underpayment rate plus 1% on the underpayment that would have occurred if the amounts had
been included in income when first defened or, if later, when they were not subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture. In addition, the amounts is subject to an additional 20% tax.
Section 409A applies to nonqualified deferred compensation plans for independent
contractors, including partners and members of LLCs taxed as partnerships, as well as
employees. But it is unclear when compensation is defened in this context. The guidance avoids
some of these questions by suggesting that payments to partners acting in their capacity as
pminers are exempt and expressly exempting anangements described in Section 736 (unless
they're subject to Section 1402(a)(10)), and guaranteed payments for services described in
Section 707(c) (unless the partner does not include the payment in income within2Yz months
after the end of the taxable year of the pminer in which the right to the payments vests). 72
The guidance defines nonqualified defened compensation in such a way as to exclude
most grants of restricted stock, grants of stock options that are not in the money when they are
granted, and stock-settled SARs with respect to publicly traded stock that likewise are not in the
money when they are granted. "Until additional guidance is issued" the guidance allows
taxpayers to treat grants of partnership interests, and options and appreciation rights with respect
to pminership interests, in the same way as transfers of corporate stock, stock options and SARs
for this purpose. It also specifically provides that the issuance of a profits interest in exchange for
services that is properly treated under existing guidance as not resulting in inclusion of income
by the service provider at the time of issuance is not treated as a defenal of compensation.
One of the distribution events permitted by Section409A is a change in the ownership or
effective control of the corporation, or in the ownership of a substantial portion of the assets of
the corporation. It is not clear whether this distribution event applies to plans maintained by
pminerships or LLCs taxed as pminerships, unless they are treated as corporations for tax
purposes. 73

preamble to some recent proposed regulations, REG-115452-14, 80 Fed. Reg. 43652 (July 23, 2015), suggests a
further narrowing of the scope of the revenue procedures. It says that the Treasury Department and the IRS "have
determined that Rev. Proc. 93-27 does not apply to ... transactions in which one party provides services and another
party receives a seemingly associated allocation and distribution of partnership income or gain," such as when "a
management company that provides services to a fund in exchange for a fee [waives] that fee, while a party related
to the management company receives an interest in future partnership profits the value of which approximates the
amount of the waived fee."
72

See Notice 2005-1,2005-2 I.R.B. 274; T.D. 9321, 72 Fed. Reg. 19234 (April17, 2007) (preamble).

73

See Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-3(i)(5).
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B.

Determination of Employment Status

The status of a worker as an employee or independent contractor for federal tax purposes
is, with few exceptions, detennined under the common law test for determining whether a
master-servant (employment) relationship exists.

Background. The common law test focuses exclusively on the employer's control or right
to control how an employee does his job. 74 It first assumed importance under the employment tax
provisions of the Code. The original Social Security Act simply defined an "employee" as
including "an officer of a corporation." 75 Treasury regulations issued in 1936 used the common
law test to determine employee status. 76 The lower comis, however, applied a variety of different
tests, some relying less than others on common law precedents. 77 In 194 7, the Supreme Comi
issued a pair of opinions that attempted to clarify the governing tests. 78 In these opinions, the
Comi applied an "economic realities" test under which "employees are those who as a matter of
economic reality are dependent on the business to which they render services." 79 Obviously, the
economic realities test, which focused on dependency, had the potential to treat many more
workers as employees than the common law test, which focused on control.
The IRS and the Social Security Administration proposed amendments to their regulations
to incorporate the Comi' s new economic realities test, but these never took effect: Congress
reacted immediately by passing (over President Truman's veto) the so-called Gearhari
Resolution, endorsing the use of the common law test. 80

Current Rules. Cunent Treasury regulations provide that an individual generally is an
employee if, under the common law test, the relationship between the individual and the person
for whom he or she performs services is the legal relationship of employer and employee. Such a
relationship generally exists if the person for whom the services are performed
has the right to control and direct the individual who performs the services, not only as to
the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by which
that result is accomplished. That is, an employee is subject to the will and control of the
74

See Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 220(1) (1958) ("A servant is a person employed to perform
services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is
subject to the other's control or right to control.").
75
Social Security Act§ 1101(a)(6), Pub. L. No. 74-271,49 Stat. 620,647 (1935). FICA was in Title VIII of
the original act. SECA was enacted on August 28, 1950.
76

Reg. 91, article 3, 1 Fed. Reg. 2049, 2052 (Nov. 11, 1936). The regulations state, inter alia, that "[i]n
general, if an individual is subject to the control or direction of another merely as to the result to be accomplished by
the work and not as to the means and methods for accomplishing the result, he is an independent contractor. An
individual performing services as an independent contractor is not as to such services an employee." This closely
resembles the language in the cunent regulations.
77

See United States v. Webb, 397 U.S. 179, 183-85 (1969), for a description of this case law.

78

Bartles v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947).

79

Bartles, 332 U.S. at 130.

80

H.R.J. Res. 296, Pub. L. No. 642, 62 Stat. 438 (1948).
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employer not only as to what shall be done but [also] how it shall be done. In this
connection, it is not necessary that the employer actually direct or control the manner in
which the services are performed; it is sufficient if he has the right to do so. The right to
discharge is also an important factor indicating that the person possessing that right is an
employer. Other factors characteristic of an employer, but not necessarily present in every
case, are the furnishing of tools and the furnishing of a place to work, to the individual
who performs the services. In general, if an individual is subject to the control or direction
of another merely as to the result to be accomplished by the work and not as to the means
and methods for accomplishing the result, he is an independent contractor. 81
Over the years, the IRS has identified 20 important factors for determining when the common
law test is satisfied. 82 These factors are listed in Table A. In the 1990s, the IRS began
emphasizing that these factors are not the only ones that may be taken into account, or even the
best way to approach the classification issue. The IRS has not departed from the basic common
law test, which focuses on control. However, the IRS instructs its agents to take all of the facts
and circumstances into account in determining whether sufficient control exists, and to organize
them according to whether they relate to behavioral control, financial control or the relationship
of the parties. 83 This approach is compared with the 20-factor test in Table B.

Statutory Employees. Congress and the courts have overridden the common law test in
some situations:
• Licensed real estate agents who work on commission pursuant to a written contract and
certain direct sellers generally are treated as independent contractors for all tax purposes. 84
• Clergy generally are treated as independent contractors for employment tax purposes
regardless ofthe circumstances.

81

Treas. Reg.§§ 31.312l(d)-1(c)(2), 31.3306(i)-1(b) & 31.3401(c)-1(b).

82

Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296. These factors originally were compiled by the Social Secmity
Administration in determining entitlement to benefits.
83

IRS, Independent Contractor or Employee? Training Materials (March 4, 1997) ("IRS Training Materials");
PLR 201311002 (Dec. 6, 2012) (relevant facts for determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent
contractor under the common law "generally fall into three categories: (I) behavioral controls, (2) financial controls, and
(3) the relationship of the parties"); Information Letter 2004-0087 (AprilS, 2004). This approach is generally consistent
with the approach taken by courts applying the common law. See, e.g., CCNV v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989); Butts v.
Comm 'r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1041 (1993), aff'd per curiam, 49 F.3d 713 (11th Cir. 1995); Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 220(2).
Courts are not always consistent, however. See, e.g., BruecherFoundation Services, Inc. v. United States,
383 Fed. Appx. 381 (5th Cir. 2010), which applied the factors fi'om Silk and whether the worker "is in business for
himself' to determine whether workers in question were employees or independent contractors. The court cited a
previous Fifth Circuit precedent for the rule that, "[a]lthough the determination of employee status is to be made by
common law concepts, a realistic interpretation of the term 'employee' should be adopted, and doubtful questions
should be resolved in favor of employment in order to accomplish the remedial purposes of the legislation involved."
84

Code § 3508.
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• Corporate officers generally are treated as employees for FICA, FUTA and income tax
withholding purposes unless they do not perform any services or perfonn only minor
services and do not receive any remuneration. 85
• Cetiain full-time life insurance salesmen, agent-drivers and commission-drivers engaged
in the distribution of specific kinds of products, homeworkers and traveling or city
salesmen generally are treated as employees for FICA and FUTA purposes unless the
individual has a substantial investment in the facilities used in the performance of the
services (other than an automobile). 86
Partners. Mere ownership of an interest in one's employer generally is not taken into
account in detetmining whether an individual is an employee. 87 Thus, employees who receive
stock as compensation for services are treated as owners, not employees, with respect to any
dividends, gains and losses from the stock from the time that the stock vests, 88 but do not lose
their status as employees with respect to their other income.
Existing law suggests that whether a partner or member of an LLC is an employee or an
employer under the common-law test is detetmined based on all of the facts in the same way as it
is for other service-providers. 89 However, the IRS has long taken the position that an individual
cannot be both a pminer and an employee of the same partnership, even with respect to different
streams ofincome. 90 Rev. Rul. 69-184 states that:

85

Code§§ 3121(d), 3306(i) & 3401(c); Treas. Reg.§ 31.3121(d)-1(c); see also CCA 200009043 (Jan. 4,
2000) and 200038045 (Aug. 9, 2000). SBSE-04-0709-039, Officer Compensation: IRC Sections 3509 and 7436, and
Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 (July 6, 2009), advises examiners that"[ q]uite often, in officer compensation
cases, there is intentional disregard of rules and regulations."). Central Motmplex, Inc. v. Comm 'r, T.C. Memo. 2014207 (Oct. 7, 2014), sustained the IRS's imposition of failure-to-file and failure-to-pay penalties under Code§ 6651
and failure-to-deposit penalties under Code § 6656 against a corporation that had classified two officers and another
worker as independent contractors. It noted that "[a]n officer of a corporation who performs more than minor services
and receives remuneration for such services is a 'statutory' employee for employment tax purposes," although it also
said in dictum that "[t]he conclusion that a corporate officer is a statutory employee may not apply to the extent that
he or she performs services in some other capacity."
86

Code§§ 3121(d) & 3306(i); Treas. Reg.§ 31.3121(d)-1(d); Rev. Rul. 90-93, 1990-2 C.B. 33. Full-time
life insurance salesmen also are tr·eated as employees for certain employee benefit purposes. Code§ 7701(a)(20);
Rev. Rul. 90-93, 1990-2 C.B. 33 (2% floor); Rev. Rul. 72-139, 1972-1 C.B. 201; Rev. Rul. 69-421, 1969-2 C.B. 59.
See Rev. Rul. 70-340, 1970-1 C.B. 202, and Lee v. United States, 870 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Tex. 1994), regarding the
meaning of "substantial investment in facilities."
87

See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296; Publication 1779, Independent Contractor or Employee.

88

See Treas. Reg.§ 1.83-l(a)(l).

89

See Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3401(c)-l(e) & 31.3121(d)-1(a)(3) ("If the relationship of employer and employee
exists, the designation or description of the relationship by the parties as anything other than that of employer and
employee is immaterial. Thus, if such relationship exists, it is of no consequence that the employee is designated as
a partner .... ").
90

E.g., Rev. Rul. 69-184, 1969-1 C.B. 256, GCM 34001 (Dec. 23, 1969); see also, e.g., GCM 34173 (July
25, 1969) (partners ca1motbe employees for income tax purposes); CCA 200117003 (April 27, 2001) (parh1ers
ca1mot be employees for employment tax purposes). In other contexts, the IRS takes the position that an individual
can serve in two capacities with respect to the same employer, provided that the two capacities are not interrelated.
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[A b ]ona fide member[ ] of a partnership ... who devotes his time and energies in the
conduct of the trade or business of the partnership, or in providing services to the
pminership as an independent contractor, is, in either event, a self-employed individual
rather than an individual who, under the usual common law mles applicable in
dete1mining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee.
The references to a "bona fide member of the partnership" and the "conduct of the trade or
business of the pminership" suggest that the drafters had in mind traditional service partners, for
whom such a conclusion might be conect in most situations. 91 But in practice the IRS's position
seems to be that granting a partnership interest to an employee always tums the employee into a
partner for tax purposes even if the interest is small and the employee does not have a significant
role in management.
Outside of the tax context, comis have suggested that partners in large partnerships who
have little management authority might be partners in name only and should in fact be classified
as employees. 92 However, the IRS has not given any indication that it is changing this position.
One way to limit the potential for conflict between the IRS's position and the common
law test is to treat the regular compensation of an employee who receives a pminership interest
as income for services that he performs other than in his capacity as a partner. Section 707(a)
suggests the possibility of such an approach, and at least one court has endorsed it. 93 However,
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 58-505, 1958-2 C.B. 728 (officers of insurance company who also sold policies as independent
contractors).
91

Under the common law test, it is difficult for a partner to qualify as an employee because the very things
that distinguish a partner of a business from an employee of a business, e.g., the fact that a partner participates in the
management of the business and shares in its gains and losses, are some of the most important things that distinguish
independent contractors from employees under the common law. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79
(1984) (Powell, J., concurring) (listing, in a Title VII case, the types of distinguishing management decisions made
by law firm partners).
92

E.g., Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 443 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1248 (1997)
(depending on the facts partners can qualify as employees under the ADEA); EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown &
Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 707 (7th Cir. 2002) (same); Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S.
440 (2003) (depending on the facts partners can qualify as employees under the ADA). In two similar letters dated
July 25 and July 29, 2013, the EEOC Office of Legal Counsel stated that:
It is well established that in some instances individuals who have the job title of "partner" may qualify as
employees for purposes of the EEO laws, including the AD EA. This principle does not represent an
expansion of the ADEA. The relevant question in each case is whether the individual acts independently
and participates in managing the organization (not an employee), or whether the individual is subject to the
organization's control (an employee) .... Thus, if a determination were made in a particular case that
individuals holding the title of"partner" are actually employees, it would be a factual determination guided
by existing law. It would neither be an expansion of the ADEA nor the result of an EEOC plan "to expand
coverage ofthe [ADEA] as to accounting firm partners."

Cf Bates van Winkelhofv Clyde & Co LLP, [2014] UKSC 32, [2014] 1 W.L.R. 2047 (Supreme Court, May 21,
2014) (a law partner can be a "worker" entitled to protection under the Employment Rights Act 1996. "As the case
of the controlling shareholder in a company who is also employed as chief executive shows, one can effectively be
one's own boss and still be a 'worker'.").
93

Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1968).
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this is exactly the approach the IRS rejected in its guidance. It appears to have done so for
administrative as much as for legal reasons. GCM 34001 (Dec. 23, 1968) explained that:
To introduce the possibility of dual "status" into the application of the statutes in question
so that the detennination of"wages" under Section 3121(a) would virtually have to be on
a transaction by transaction basis (rather than one based on a single continuing
relationship) would render it ahnost impossible to administer the employment taxes of
subtitle C. It is hardly rational to assert that Congress intended or would approve such a
result merely because the statute which it wrote did not link up an individual's "status of
an employee" with the person for whom the individual performs services ....
The IRS's position has a particularly harsh impact on individuals historically treated as
employees who receive (often small) partnership or LLC interests as compensation for services.
They are transfmmed into independent contractors with respect to all of their compensation,
causing them to be subject to different employment tax rules, and potentially resulting in a loss
of employee benefits and even disqualifYing employee benefit plans in which they pmiicipate.
Partnerships and LLCs taxed as partnerships have used various planning techniques to avoid
these consequences, including employing the individuals at one entity while granting them
partnership or LLC interests from another entity. But the effectiveness of some of these
techniques has been questioned. 94
New proposed regulations 95 and conversations with officials in the IRS National Office
suggest that the IRS might be reconsidering its position, and several groups have submitted
comments on the issue. But it is too soon to predict whether any change will occur.

Section 530. Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 provides statutory relief from
reclassification for certain employers involved in employment tax controversies with the IRS. 96
Generally speaking, Section 530 prohibits the IRS :l:i'om challenging an employer's treatment of
an employee as an independent contractor for employment tax purposes if the employer has a
reasonable basis for such treatment, including:

94
See, e.g., Treas. Reg.§ 301.7701-2T, which was added by T.D. 9766, 81 Fed. Reg. 26693 (May 4, 2016),
and addresses the technique of employing an individual at one entity while granting the individual a pmtnership or
LLC interest from a disregarded entity immediately below the employing entity.
95
The preamble to REG-115452-14, supra note 71, contains the cryptic statement that "if an arrangement is
subject to section 707(a), taxpayers should look to relevant authorities to determine the status of the service provider
as an independent contractor or employee. See, generally, Rev. Rul. 69-184, 1969-1 C.B. 256. More directly, the
preamble to T.D. 9766, supra note 94, requests conm1ents on "the impact on employee benefit plans (including, but
not limited to, qualified retirement plans, health and welfare plans, and fringe benefit plans) and on employment
taxes if Rev. Rul. 69-184 were to be modified to permit partners to also be employees in cettain circumstances."
96 Section 530 is codified as a note to Code § 3401 in the United States Code, but is not actually a part of
the Internal Revenue Code. Congress intended Section 530 "to be liberally construed in favor of the taxpayer." See
H.R. Rep. No. 95-1748, at 5 (1978). For IRS procedures regarding the application of Section 530, see generally
Intemal Revenue Manual (Examinations)~~ 4.23.5.2 et seq.
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• Classifying the employee as an independent contractor is supported by judicial precedent,
published rulings, a technical advice memorandum issued with respect to the taxpayer, or
a letter ruling issued to the taxpayer.
• A past employment tax or other IRS audit resulted in no assessment of employment taxes
for improperly classified employees in substantially similar positions. Employers may not
rely on an audit commencing after 1996 unless the audit included an employment tax
examination of whether the worker involved (or a similarly situated worker) should be
classified as an employee.
• The independent contractor classification is supported by a long-standing and recognized
practice in a significant segment of the taxpayer's industry. A taxpayer does not have to
show the practice of more than 25% of an industry in order to meet this requirement. An
industry practice need not have continued for more than 10 years in order to be considered
long-standing, and will not fail to be longstanding merely because it began after 1978.
In order for the relief to be available, the employer must treat all employees in substantially
similar positions as independent contractors (substantive consistency) and must file all federal
tax retums, including Form 1099-MISC, on a basis consistent with treating them as an
independent contractors (reporting consistency). In determining whether a worker holds a
substantially similar position to another worker, the relationship of the parties must be taken into
account.
At the beginning of a worker classification audit, the IRS must give the taxpayer a written
notice regarding Section 530. A worker does not have to be an employee in order for Section 530
to apply. If a taxpayer establishes a prima facie case that it was reasonable not to treat a worker
as an employee on one of the bases listed above in a Section 530 case, and the taxpayer
cooperates with reasonable IRS requests, the burden of proof shifts to the IRS. If a taxpayer
prospectively changes its treatment of workers from independent contractors to employees for
employment tax purposes, the change will not affect the applicability of Section 530 to those
workers for prior periods. 97
Section 530 also generally prohibits the IRS from issuing regulations or publishing
revenue rulings addressing the status of workers as employees or independent contractors for
employment tax purposes. 98 Section 1706 of the Tax Refmm Act of 1986 excludes taxpayers that
broker the services of technical services workers from coverage under Section 530.

97
See generally Section 530, as amended by the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-188, and H.R. Conf. Rep. No 104-737, at 199-205 (1996).
98

H.R. 5804, the Taxpayer Responsibility, Accountability, and Consistency Act, would repeal Section 530
and replace it with a new safe harbor provision that the bill's sponsors believe would more clearly define who can be
classified as an independent contractor.
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Section 530 relief does not apply to employees. They remain responsible for employee
half of FICA (but not for SECA taxes, because they are not, in fact, independent contractors). 99
Section 530 applies solely to federal employment taxes, but many states will follow it if
federal Section 530 relief has been granted.

Relevance ofIncorporation. An employee generally cannot change his or her status to that
of an independent contractor via incorporation. The common law test focuses on the relationship
between the individual perfmming the services and the service-recipient; if an employment
relationship exists, it generally is inelevant whether payments are made directly or through a
corporation controlled by the individual. 100
An independent contractor cannot change his or her status to that of an employee of his or
her client simply by fanning a wholly-owned corporation and becoming an employee ofthe
corporation. He or she may, however, be treated as an employee of the corporation for certain
purposes, 101 and take advantage, inter alia, of various employee benefit provisions of the Code.
The individual will, moreover, not be subject to the 2% floor on itemized deductions or other
limits on employee trade or business expense deductions to the extent he or she causes such
expenses to be deducted at the corporate level. However, if the corporation elects to be taxed as a
Subchapter S corporation under Section 1362 and his or her ownership interest exceeds 2%, he
or she will be treated as a partner for purposes of the employee fringe benefit provisions of the
Code. 102

99

Form 8919 (Uncollected Social Security and Medicare Tax on Wages) is used for this purpose.

100

The Tax Comt and the IRS essentially take the position that providing personal services through a
wholly-owned company (sometimes called a "loan-out company") has no effect on whether the individual providing
the services is treated as an employee of the company receiving the services. Leavell v. Comm 'r, 104 T.C. 140 (1995);
Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296; Rev. Rul. 74-330, 1974-2 C.B. 278 (examples (1), (2)); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99841, at 11-835 (1986); 132 Cong. Rec. S8088-89 (June 20, 1986); cf Johnson v. Comm 'r, 78 T.C. 882 (1982), a.ff'd
without published opinion, 734 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1984). Thus, if the company receiving the services has enough
control over how the individual performs the services to be considered the employer, it does not matter whether the
service contract specifies that the individual is an employee of his wholly-owned company and that any directions are
to be sent through the wholly-owned company. In its most recent decision, the Tax Court quoted with approval
another judge's observation in a case involving professional hockey players that "[t]he idea that the coach issued
orders to [the players] in their capacity as corporate officers, which orders they then relayed to themselves as
corporate employees, is fanciful."
On the other hand, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have issued decisions treating such language in the service
contract as controlling as long as the wholly-owned company is not a sham. See Idaho Ambucare Cente1~ Inc. v.
United States, 57 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 1995); Sargent v. Comm 'r, 929 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir., 1991), rev 'g 93 T.C. 572
(1989); cf Keller v. Comm 'r, 723 F2d 58 (lOth Cir. 1983), a.ff'g 77 T.C. 1014 (1981) (affitming allocation of income
attributable to physician's medical practice to his wholly-owned professional corporation rather than to him as an
individual). Citing the Eighth Circuit decision, the IRS's training materials for its agents note that comts are reluctant
to disregard loan-out companies that are not shams.
101

See, e.g., Darrell Han·is, Inc. v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 1492 (W.D. Okla. 1991); Spicer
Accounting, 918 F.2d at 94.
102

See supra note 42.
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Relevance of Contract. Language in a contract is not dispositive in determining whether a
worker is an employee or independent contractor for federal tax purposes. 103 Nevertheless, a
contract might be relevant in making that determination to the extent it provides evidence of the
parties' intent, the extent to which the service-recipient can control and direct the worker, and
other factors taken into account in making that determination. 104 A contract also can be used to
clarify the effect of a worker's status as an employee or independent contractor. For example, a
contract with a worker generally can provide that the worker, despite being classified as an
employee, may not participate in any of employee benefit plans maintained by the employer for
its employees. 105
Treatment under state law also is not dispositive. 106

C.

Identification of Employer

Multi-Party Arrangements. Sometimes more than one entity controls at least some
aspects of the employment relationship. For example, a leasing company might have the right to
determine the amount of wages and benefits that leased employees will receive, and to hire or
fire the employees, while the service-recipient might have the right to supervise their work on a
daily basis. In such a situation it might not be clear which entity is the employee's common law
employer.
The exact identity of the common law employer is somewhat less relevant for
employment tax purposes. The IRS recognizes at least three ways for common law employers to
transfer some of their employment tax obligations to another party: 107
•

Under the "statutory employer" rule, if an entity other than the common law employer
controls the payment of wages to the employee, it is treated as an employer for purposes
of withholding, reporting and paying employment taxes, even if it controls no other
aspect of the employment relationship. 108 The entity uses its own EIN and is solely liable

103

E.g., Professional & Executive Leasing, 862 F.2d at 754.

104

E.g., Sargent, 929 F.2d at 1256-58.

105

See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.401 (k)-1 (a)(3)(v) (recognizing validity of one-time election not to participate in a
plan); Rev. Rul. 80-47, 1980-1 C.B. 83 (a qualified plan may deny participation to employees who decline to authorize
salary withholding or to take a physical exam); cf Rev. Rul. 80-351, 1980-2 C.B. 152 (waiver by employer's only
nonhighly compensated employee causes plan to fail to meet minimum coverage requirements). Of course, language
giving effect to the provision should be included in any plan to which it applies. Without such language, the provision
might not be part the plan and thus might not be able to modify the eligibility conditions in the plan.
106
See, e.g., CCA 200827007 (March 10, 2008) (addressing whether the employees of an employee leasing
company's client companies are its employees for PUT A tax refund purposes, where state law treats the employees
as performing services for the leasing company for state unemployment insurance purposes).
107

See generally REG-102966-10, 78 Fed. Reg. 6056 (Jan. 29, 2013).

108

{

Code§ 3401(d)(l); Treas. Reg.§ 31.3401(d)-l(f); Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43 (1974); General
Motors C01p. v. United States, 91-1 U.S.T.C. ~ 50,032 (B.D. Mich. 1990); CCA 199932002 (Feb. 26, 1999); GCM
38441 (July 11, 1980); GCM 38208 (Dec. 19, 1979). In GCM 38208 (Dec. 19, 1979), the IRS concluded that the
General Accounting Office ("GAO") had "control," within the meaning of Code § 3401 (d), over back wage payments
that a court had ordered paid to employees of certain government agencies, because the GAO controlled the

21
© 2016 Kurt L.P. Lawson

for any unpaid taxes, penalties and interest. 109 However, the identity of the common law
employer is still used to determine whether there is any liability for employment taxes in
the first place (e.g., whether an exemption is available), and the amount of the liability
(e.g., whether wages paid to an employee working multiple jobs are aggregated to
determine whether they exceed the taxable wage base. 110
•

Section 3504 allows a common law employer to appoint an agent to perform some or all
of its employment tax obligations. The entity uses its own ElN but is jointly liable with
employer for any unpaid taxes, penalties and interest. Generally an agent is appointed by
filing a Fmn1 2678. 111 However, the regulations were amended recently 112 to treat a

appropriations account fi:om which the payments were made. The IRS concluded that the court did not have "control"
because it merely ordered the payments to be made, and that the Treasury Depmtment agency that issued the checks
and performed other bookkeeping functions did not have "control" because it could perform those ministerial ftmctions
only with the approval of the GAO. See also CCA 20131801F (March 29, 2013) (county is statutory employer of
constables because "the constables' payment for [their] services is controlled by the County, as the funds come from
County checking accounts and the County Manager of Constable Services verifies all submissions for payments");
General Motors Cmp. v. United States, 91-1 U.S.T.C. ~ 50,032 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (design finn was employer and not
mere agent of General Motors responsible for "ministerial task" of disbursing paychecks to designers).
The issue comes up fi·equently in the PEO context. In that regard, TAM 20I347020 (Aug. 15, 20I3) states that
"the Office of Chief Counsel has consistently stated that a PEO or similar employee leasing company is not in control
ofthe payment of wages [for purposes of Code§ 3401(d)(1)] if the payment of wages is contingent upon, or
proximately related to, the PEO having first received funds from its clients."
It is not clear how the mle applies to tip income. See TAM 201347020 (Aug. 15, 2013) ("While we have not
answered the specific question of whether a section 3401 (d)(l) employer with respect to non-tip wages can also be a
section 3401 (d)(l) employer with respect to liability for the employer FICA tax on tip wages by vittue of section
3I2I (q), as discussed above, there is statutmy suppmt for that position and it is consistent with the desire (as reflected
by the comts' extension of section 3401 (d)( 1) to the other federal employment taxes) to consolidate the employment
tax liability on wages with the person who is in control of the payment of the wages.").
109

See REG-102966-10, supra note I07; Internal Revenue Manual~ 5.1.24.3.2.2 (08-15-20I2).

110

See, e.g., Blue Lake Rancheria v. United States, 653 F.3d 1112 (9th Cit-. 20 II) (FUTA exemption for
services performed for Indian tribe does not apply not when tribe is merely a "statutmy employer" that operates as
common paymaster); Cencast Services, L.P. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 159 (2004), aff'd, 729 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cit-.
20 I3), cert. denied, I34 S. Ct. 2831 (20 14) (payroll service company that supplied production employees to movie
industry requit·ed to apply separate wage cap with respect to each production company that had employment
relationship with each production worker during year, and thus "the common law employers cannot decrease their
liability by retaining entities such as Cencast to actually make the wage payments to the employees").
Section346 of Division Q (also called the Protecting Americans fi·om Tax Hikes Act of20I5) of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (Pub. L. No. 114-I13) effectively reversed Cencast. It treats remuneration
paid by a "motion picture project employer" to a "motion picture project worker" as remuneration paid for
employment of the motion picture project worker. A "motion picture project employer" is a kit1d of leasing company
that treats the motion picture project workers as its employees and has signed a CBA with a union that represents the
workers.
111

Rev. Proc. 2013-39,2013-52 I.R.B. 830, describes and updates the procedure for requesting the IRS
authorize a person to act as a payroll tax agent under Code § 3504. Both the employer and the agent must have
EINs. See IRS Information Letter 2005-021I (Sept. 22, 2005).
112
See Treas. Reg. § 31.3504-2, T.D. 9662, 79 Fed. Reg. 17860 (March 31, 20 14). Reflecting how liability
is shared between an employer and an agent, SBSE-05-0615-0049, Interim Guidance for the Correction of
Professional Employer Organization Accounts Not Liable for Employment Taxes (June 11, 20 15) says that when a
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person that pays wages to the employees of a client (and is not the actual cmmnon-law
employer or the statutory employer under Section 3401(d), and has not obtained a Form
2678 from the client) as the client's agent under Section 3504 for employment tax
(including FICA, FUTA and RRTA taxes and federal income tax withholding) purposes
if the person has a written or oral agreement with the client pursuant to which it (1)
assetis that it is the employer (or co-employer) of the employees and (2) assumes
responsibility to collect, report, and pay, or assumes liability for, any employment taxes
with respect to the wages. A person would be treated as asserting that it is the employer
(or co-employer) of the employees if it agrees to (i) recmit and hire the employees or
assign the employees as petmanent or temporary members of the client's workforce, (ii)
hire the employees as its own and then provide them back to the client to perform
services for the client, or (iii) file employment tax returns using its own EIN that include
wages or compensation paid to the employees.
•

An employer may contract with a payroll service provider (PSP) or repmiing agent to
perform some or all of its some of its employment tax obligations. In this situation, the
employer remains solely liable for any unpaid taxes, penalties and interest. 113 Reporting
agents are appointed using a Fmm 8655.

•

Section 3511 treats a "certified" PEO as the sole employer for purposes of complying
with its clients' payroll tax obligations, and treats the PEO and the client, respectively, as
successor employers when employees are transfened between them. Section 7705 defines
a certified PEO as a PEO that has applied for that certification and satisfies certain
requirements, including bonding, financial review requirements, and reporting and
recordkeeping requirements. Regulations opening the program were issued in 2016, 114
and the initial application deadline was September 30, 2016. 115

PEO has failed to pay employment taxes on wages attributable to any client employees before April1, 2014 (when
Treas. Reg. § 31.3504-2 became effective), if the facts and circumstances indicate that the clients remained the
employers, the IRS assess the appropriate amount of employment taxes against the clients and abate any
corresponding tax liability previously assessed against the PEO.

See Pediatric Affiliates v. United States, 2007-1 U.S.T.C. ~ 50,477 (3rd Cir. 2007); United States v.
Total Employment Co., Inc., 2004-1 U.S.T.C. ~ 50,177 (M.D. Fla. 2004) ("The common law employer has a nondelegateable [sic] duty to timely perform its federal income tax obligations and cannot avoid its tax liability by
contracting away the responsibility for the payment of wages."). The issue appears in "employee leasing" context,
and should be addressed in contract arrangements. See "Outsourcing Payroll Duties Can be a Sound Business
Practice, but Know Your Tax Responsibilities as an Employer," SSA/IRS Reporter (Spring 2006).
113

Sometimes there is an issue whether funds handed over by a client to a PSP for deposit with the
government are nevertheless reachable by the PSP's own creditors. Compare In re Fil·stPay, Inc., 773 F.3d 583 (4th
Cir. 2014) (not reachable), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2890 (2015), with Slobodian v. United States, 2014 WL 2041815
(M.D. Pa., May 12, 2014) (potentially reachable).
114

T.D. 9768, 81 Fed. Reg. 27315 (May 6, 20 16).

115

See Notice 2016-49,2016-34 I.R.B. 265. Rev. Proc. 2016-33, 2016-25 I.R.B. 1034, explains the
application procedure for becoming a certified professional employer organization.
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The identity of the common law employer also remains important for income tax
purposes. For example, only the common law employer of an employee may provide him or her
with benefits that are limited to employees, and entities that are not common law employers are
not subject to any nondiscrimination or other obligations imposed on common law employers
with respect to their employees.
Typically, which of two or more entities in a multi -party employment situation is the
employer of a particular worker is determined by analyzing each entity's relationship with the
worker in light of the usual common law factors. 116 This analysis has obvious limitations where
no single patty has enough control clearly to satisfy the common law test.
Under the common law, two or more entities may be treated as an employee's "joint
employer" or "co-employers" if they share control over the employee. 117 The IRS has recognized
that, because the mle is based on the common law, it applies for employment tax purposes. 118
Under the related "bonowed servant" mle, an employee who is sent by one employer to work for
another may be considered an employee of both "so long as, by the service rendered another, he
is performing the business entmsted to him by the general employer. There is no inference that
because the general employer has permitted a division of control, he has smTendered it." 119 Since
the common law also applies for purposes of the employee benefit provisions of the Code, these
mles presumably apply in that context, as wel1. 120 However, in practice the IRS has not been
inclined to apply it in either context. 121

116

See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2002-21,2002-1 C.B. 911 ("Comts have also found that common law factors are
applicable to determine which of two entities is the employer for pmposes of retirement plans"); Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1
C.B. 296 (applying common law test to identify employer in multi-patty employment situation); Vizcaino v. Microsoft
C01p., 173 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1105 (2000) (rejecting lower comt's application of slightly
different test in multi-patty employment situation in order to determine whether workers were entitled to certain
employee benefits); Professional & Executive Leasing, supra note 31 (applying common law test to identify employer in
employee leasing situation in order to determine whether leasing company's plans were tax-qualified).
117

See Restatement (Second) of Agency§§ 226 (joint employment) and 227 (bonowed servants).

118

Rev. Rul. 66-162, 1966-1 C.B. 234; see Alford v. United States, 116 F.3d 334 (8th Cir. 1997) (rejecting
in dictum government's approach, which had been adopted by the district court, of combining the control exercised
by several entities over an individual in determining whether he was an employee).
119

Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 227 (1958); cf Rev. Rul. 59-68, 1959-1 C.B. 95 (officer's
employment with miginal employer was not tenninated for purposes of statutory stock option rules when he was
assigned to perfonn services for an affiliated company).

°

12

Cf Vizcaino v. Microsoft Cmp., supra note 116 ("Even if for some pmposes a [temporary worker hired
through an agency] is considered an employee of the agency, that would not preclude his status [as] conm1on law
employee of Microsoft. The two are not mutually exclusive ..... At common law, 'a servant ... pennitted by his
master to perfonn services for another may become the servant of such other in performing the services."').
121
Proc. 2002-21, 2002-1 C.B. 911, which required plans maintained by PEOs for the benefit ofworksite
employees of their clients to be tenninated or converted into multiple employer plans to avoid being disqualified,
implicitly rejected the position espoused by the PEO industry that they and their clients were co-employers of the
worksite employees. See also, e.g., PLR 200017041 (March 3, 2000) (stating that "[t]he concept of a 'co-employer'
is not recognized in Subtitle C [the employment tax provisions] of the Internal Revenue Code," despite the fact that
it was applied in that context in Rev. Rul. 66-162). But see CCA 200415008 (Jan 9, 2004) (stating that "[i]f a client
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The Code contains a few specialmles for dealing with multi-party arrangements. For
example, Section 414(n) provides that a leased employee who has worked for a service-recipient
on a substantially full-time basis for at least a year may be allowed to participate in the servicerecipient's employee benefit plans as a common law employee and must be considered an
employee in determining whether those plans discriminate in favor of highly compensated
employees, but only if the service-recipient exercises "primary direction or control" over the
employee. 122 Section 3506 provides that a sitter-referral agency will not be treated as the
employer of the sitter.
Affiliated Entities. Sometimes an employer is affiliated with other entities. If so, it might
not be clear whether the affiliate is part of the employer, with the same rights and responsibilities
towards employees of the employer as the employer itself, or instead is a separate entity. Entities
that are legally separate, such as separate corporations, are not aggregated for employment tax
purposes regardless of their degree of affiliation. However, if a group of related corporations
pays wages tln·ough a single member of the group-the "common paymaster"-that member
may be treated as the employer of all of the entities' employees who are concurrently employed
by all of the entities for employment tax purposes. 123
Disregarded Entities. Previously, the owner of a single-member partnership or LLC that
was disregarded as an entity separate fi·om its owner for federal tax purposes had two choices for
filing employment tax returns: either calculate, report, and pay the employment taxes of the
disregarded entity's employees under its own name and EIN, or allow the disregarded entity to
separately calculate, report, and pay the employment tax obligations incurred with respect to
employees of the entity under the entity's name and EIN. 124 Since 2009, however, disregarded
entities have been treated as separate entities for employment tax and related repmiing
requirement purposes (but not backup withholding and related infmmation reporting requirement
purposes). 125 Most states apply similar mles.

company was the common law employer of workers it leased from [a PEO], [the PEO] could also be a common law
employer under the theory of co-employment").
122

The "primary direction or control" requirement was added in 1996, replacing a requirement that the
services performed be "of a type historically performed, in the business field of the [employer], by employees."
Primary direction or control means that the employer exercises the majority of the direction and control over the
individual. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-737, at 259 (1996).
123

See Code§ 312l(s); Treas. Reg.§ 31.3121(s)-l.

124
Notice 99-6, 1999-3 I.R.B. 12. The Notice states that, regardless of the choice made, "the owner retains
ultimate responsibility for the employment tax obligations incurred with respect to employees of the disregarded
entity." Cf Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1186 (2008) (sole owner
responsible for employment taxes of disregarded LLCs).
125

T.D. 9356,72 Fed. Reg. 45891 (Aug. 16, 2007). Cf T.D. 9554,76 Fed. Reg. 67363 (Nov. 1, 2011)
(extending the exceptions from FICA and FUTA taxes for relatives and members of religious faiths to entities that are
disregarded as separate from their owners for federal tax purposes).

25
© 2016 Kurt L.P. Lawson

III.

OTHER LAWS

A.

Differences in Treatment

1.

Federal Labor Laws

Most federal labor laws apply only or primarily to employees.
ADA (Title 1). Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") generally prohibits
an employer with 15 or more employees from discriminating on the basis of disability with
respect to the terms, conditions and privileges of employment, including the provision of
employee benefits. Independent contractors are not covered by this prohibition. 126 However, in
appropriate circumstances they might be covered by prohibitions found in other titles of ADA.
ADEA. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") generally prohibits an
employer with 20 or more employees from discriminating on the basis of age with respect to the
terms, conditions and privileges of employment, including the provision of employee benefits.
Independent contractors are not covered by this prohibition. 127
COBRA. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA")
amended the Code and ERISA generally to require a group health plan maintained by an
employer with 20 or more employees to give covered employees and their beneficiaries the right
to continue coverage under the plan after their coverage has ceased, if coverage ceases on
account of certain qualifying events. 128 This requirement applies to employees and independent
contractors, provided that plan covers at least some common law employees. 129
ERISA (Title 1). Employee pension and welfare benefit plans are subject to various
coverage, funding, fiduciary, reporting, and other requirements under Title I of ERISA. Title I
does not apply to plans benefiting only nonemployees, and many ofthe specific requirements of
Title I extend only to employee-patiicipants. 130

Because plan coverage typically is limited to employees, an employer's unilateral
reclassification of an employee as an independent contractor, or discharge followed by rehire as
an independent contractor (e.g., outsourcing), can under some circumstances be viewed as a
violation of ERISA § 510, which prohibits any person from discharging or discriminating against

2
1 6

42 u.s.c. §§ 12111(4) & 12112.

127

29 U.S. C.§§ 623(a) & 630(f); 48 Fed. Reg. 26434 (Jtme 7, 1983) (preamble); see Hyland v. New Haven
Radiology Assocs., P. C., 794 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1986).
128

Code§ 4980B, ERISA§§ 601-08.

129

Code § 4980B(f)(7); ERISA§ 607(2).

130

ERISA§§ 3(3), (6), 4(a) & 402l(a); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3; Texas v. AWance Employee Leasing Cmp.,
797 F. Supp. 542 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
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a participant "for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such
participant may become entitled under the plan" or ERISA. 131

FMLA. The Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") generally requires an employer
with 50 or more employees to allow employees to take up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave (with the
right to reinstatement) for cetiain family and/or medical purposes. Independent contractors need
not be allowed to take such leave. 132
WARN Act. The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification ("WARN") Act requires
an employer that employs 100 or more employees to notify employees affected by a plant
closing or their union representatives at least 60 days before the closing occurs. Independent
contractors are not required to receive such notice. 133
Affordable Care Act. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as amended by the
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of2010 (together the "Affordable Care Act" or
"ACA"), imposes an excise tax on a large employer (generally one with at least 50 full-time
employees, determined on a full-time equivalent basis, during the previous year) if it either does
not make a health plan meeting cetiain standards available to all of its full-time employees, or
makes one available and it is not affordable, thus pe1mitting a lower-income employee to obtain
a government subsidy to purchase coverage on one of the health insurance exchanges established
under the ACA. Employers subject to this requirement must file information retums with the IRS
detailing the coverage they provide, and give similar statements to all full-time employees. The
excise tax does not apply with respect to independent contractors. 134
Other Labor Laws. Independent contractors generally are not covered by the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), and therefore generally may not engage in collective bargaining
or similar protected activities. 135 They also receive no protection under the nondiscrimination
requirements of the Equal Pay Act ("EPA") 136 or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 137 the
safety requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA") 138 or the minimum
wage and ovetiime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). 139 Independent
131

E.g., Gitlitz v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 129 P.3d 554, 559 (11th Cir. 1997); Seaman v. Arvida
Realty Sales, Inc., 985 P.2d 543, 547 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 916 (1993).
132

29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(3) & 2612; 29 C.P.R.§ 825.100.

133

29 U.S.C. § 2102(a); 29 C.P.R. Part 339.

134

Notice 2015-17,2015-14 I.R.B. 845, announces that, until further guidance is issued and in any event
through 2015, the excise tax will not be imposed on S corporations with respect to the coverage of their 2%
shareholders.
135

29 U.S. C. §§ 152 & 157. See North American Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 869 P.2d 596, 598 (2d Cir. 1989).

136

29 U.S.C. § 206(d); 29 C.P.R.§ 1620.13.

137

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b ), (f). See Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 950 P.2d 377 (7th
Cir. 1991); accord EEOC Compliance Manual Section 605, Appendix H.
138

29 U.S.C. §§ 652(6) & 654(a)(l).

139

29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e)(l), 206 & 207. See Wallingv. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150 (1947).
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contractors who leave to perfmm military service are not entitled to reemployment or seniority
rights under the Unifmmed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994
("USERRA"). 14 Furthe1more, employers are not subject to penalties under the Immigration
Refmm and Control Act ("IRCA") with respect to the receipt of services from independent
contractors. 141 Also, independent contractors are not covered by the Employee Polygraph
Protection Act ("EPPA"), which prohibits most private employers from using lie detector tests,
either for pre-employment screening or during the course of employment. 142

°

Unlike the income and employment tax provisions of the Code, no laws comparable to
the laws described above apply to independent contractors. For example, while independent
contractors are not subject to FICA taxes, they are subject to roughly the same level of SECA
taxes. By contrast, if a worker is classified as an independent contractor under a federal law
prohibiting a particular fmm of discrimination, he generally has no protection from that form of
discrimination under federal law.

2.

Federal Patent and Copyright Laws

Under the "work made for hire" doctrine, an employer generally is considered the author
of any work prepared during the course of an employee's employment for purposes of the federal
copyright laws; no such presumption exists with respect to work prepared by independent
contractors, and the client owns the work only if it obtains a written assignment of copyright
ownership, or enters into a written agreement explicitly stating that the work is for hire. 143 By
contrast, the traditional principle under federal patent law is that ownership of a patent vests in
the inventor unless there is an express agreement to the contrary, and generally no legal
distinction is drawn between employees and independent contractors for this purpose. 144 In
practice, however, independent contractors might find it somewhat easier to secure patent
protection for on-the-job creations than employees, since this issue often turns on a court's

140
38 U.S.C. §§ 4303 & 4312; see, e.g., Wilson v. Toledo Area Sheet Metal Joint Apprenticeship
Committee, 560 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1977); Brown v. Luster, 165 F.2d 181, 184 (9th Cir. 1947) (prior law).
141

8 U.S.C. § 1324a. However, this exception is subject to an anti-abuse rule. 8 U.S. C.§ 1324a(a)(4); 8
C.F.R. §§ 274a.1G) & 274a.5.
142

29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009.

143

17 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 201(b) (work-for-hire). See, e.g., CCNVv. Reid, 490 U.S. at 738,Aldon
Accessories, Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 551-52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
144
See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys. Inc., 131 S. Ct.
2188 (2011); Francklyn v. Guilford Packing Co., 695 F.2d 1158, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 1983); B.F. Gladding & Co. v.
Scientific Anglers, Inc., 248 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1957).
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analysis ofthe bargain stmck between the parties. 145 Courts have come to differing decisions
regarding trade secrets. 146

3.

State Labor Laws

Many state laws also impose different requirements on employers and employees on the
one hand and independent contractors and their clients on the other. In particular, employers
generally are required to contribute a portion of the wages paid to each of their employees to
state workers' compensation and unemployment funds. 147 Clients of independent contractors
generally are not required to do so, and, as a consequence, independent contractors generally are
not eligible for benefits under these systems. Employee wages also might be protected under
state wage payment laws, while payments to independent contractors are not. 148 To the extent
that employers' right to discharge employees at will has been limited, the limits apply solely to
employees. Non-employees also generally are not covered by state workplace safety laws. 149

B.

Determination of Employment Status

In Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 150 the Supreme Court held that, when a statute
uses the term "employee" without defining it, Congress is presumed to have intended to apply
the common law test. Many of the federal labor laws discussed above do not contain useful
definitions of the te1m "employee." Thus, employment status under those laws-include Title I

145

This is especially true of the so-called "shop right" doctrine, under which an employer or client may
claim royalty-free use of an invention. See, e.g., Hobbs v. United States, 376 F.2d 488,495 (5th Cir. 1967); Cram v.
Cement Gun Co., 46 F. Supp. 403, 404 (D. Del. 1942).
146

Compare Hicklin Engineering LLC v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 2006) (trade secrets developed by
independent contractor were property of employer), with Computer Associates International, Inc. v. American
Fundware Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Colo. 1993) (property of independent contractor).
147

See, e.g., N.Y. Workers' Compensation Law§ 210 (Consol. 1997); N.Y. Labor Law§§ 560 & 570
(tmemployment insurance).
148
See, e.g., N.Y. Workers' Compensation Law§ 50 (requirement that employer provide security for
payment of wage compensation).
149

States with such laws include Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.
150

503 u.s. 318, 323 (1992).
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of ADA, 151 ADEA, 152 COBRA, Title I of ERISA, 153 the Medicare secondary payor mles, 154
NLRA, 155 USERRA, 156 and Title VII 157-is determined using the common law test. 158
That has not always been tme. Before Darden, agencies and comis were more inclined to
apply a version ofthe economic realities test adopted by the Supreme Comi in 1947 and
subsequently rejected by Congress in the Gearhart Resolution. Moreover, in applying that test for
purposes of a particular law, they tended to focus on whether the worker was a potential victim

151
Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P. C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (agreeing with EEOC's
"focus on the common-law touchstone of control" to determine whether physician-shareholders were employees of
PC).
152

See Birchem v. Knights of Columbus, 116 F.3d 310, 312 (8th Cir. 1997); Speen v. Crown Clothing Cmp.,
102 F.3d 625, 631 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1276 (1997); Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir.
1993); Mukhtar v. Castleton Sen,ice Cmp., 920 F. Supp. 934 (S.D. Ind. 1996); EEOC Enforcement Guidance, No.
915.002, Application ofEEO Laws to Contingent Workers Placed by Tempora1y Employment Agencies and Other
Staffing Firms, note 10 (Dec. 3, 1997) ("EEOC Enforcement Guidance"); cf Appendix to Part 1630,56 Fed. Reg.
35726, 35740 (July 26, 1991) ("employee" has same meaning under ADA and Title VII).
153
Darden, 503 U.S. at 323; Estate ofSuskovich v. Anthem Health Plans of Virginia Inc., 43 E.B.C. 1704
(S.D. Ind. 2007). The statutory employee provisions of the Code presumably also apply for purposes of ERISA. See
DOL Advisory Opinions 78-33A (March 29, 1978), 77-75A (Sept. 21, 1977).
154

42 C.F.R. §§ 411.101 & 411.104(£); contra Therkelsen v. Shalala, 839 F. Supp. 661,667 (D. Minn.

1993).
155

NLRB v. United Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968); see also Roadway Package System, Inc.,
326 NLRB No. 72 (1998); Dial-A-Mattress Operath1g Cmporation, 326 NLRB No. 75 (1998); cf FedEx Home
Delive1y v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that "both this court and the Board, while retaining all
of the cmmnonlaw factors, 'shift[ed the] emphasis' away from the unwieldy control inquiry in favor of a more
accurate proxy: whether the 'putative independent contractors have 'significant entrepreneurial oppmtunity for gain
or loss.' ' ... Thus, while all the considerations at common law remain in play, an important animating principle by
which to evaluate those factors in cases where some factors cut one way and some the other is whether the position
presents the oppmtunities and risks inherent in entrepreneurialism.").
156

Brown, 165 F.2d at 185 (contractor status determined using common law test under pre-USERRA law).

157

Cilecekv. !nova Health System Services, 115 F.3d 256,259 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1049
(1998); Lambertsen v. Utah Department of Corrections, 79 F.3d 1024, 1028 (lOth Cir. 1996); Wilde v. County of
Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 106 (8th Cir. 1994); Blagg v. Technology Group, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Colo.
2004); EEOC Enforcement Guidance at note 10. See also Mariotti v. Mariotti Building Products Inc., 714 F.3d 761
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 437 (2013) (applying test in Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, supra note
151, to business entities that are not professional corporations in actions brought under Title VII). But see Juino v.
Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2013) ("We apply the 'economic realities/common law
control test,' a variation of the common law agency test, in determining whether a party is an employee or an
independent contractor [for purposes of Title VII]. [citation omitted] The economic-realities pmiion of the test asks
whether putative employees, 'as a matter of economic reality, are dependent upon the business to which they render
service.' [citation omitted] The common law conh·ol pmiion of the test, which courts should emphasize over the
economic realities pmiion, assesses 'the extent to which the one for whom the work is being done has the right to
control the details and means by which the work is to be pe1formed. "').
158

See also AM 2009-002 (Jan. 27, 2009) (where the language of a statute that authorizes a federal agency
to hire a worker pursuant to a personal service contract does not directly address how the worker is to be classified
for federal employment tax purposes, and where no other federal statute or regulation provides specific direction on
this question, the worker's status is determined using the common law test).
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of the "wrong" being "righted" by that law. This resulted in a test that was result-driven and even
more complex and subjective than the common law test.
The economic realities test continues to apply where it is required or authorized by statute,
including FMLA, EPA and FLSA. 159 Many state wage payment, workers' compensation and
unemployment insurance statutes also apply (or are interpreted by the courts or the agencies
responsible for interpreting them to apply) definitions that are more expansive than the common
law.r6o
Even in contexts where it applies, the common law test is taking a while to sink in. For
example, the IRS Training Materials list financial control as a factor to be taken into account in
determining whether a worker is an employee. However, they carefully note that
The question to be asked is whether the recipient has the right to direct and control
business-related means and details of the worker's perfonnance. The question is not
whether the worker is economically dependent on or independent of the business for
which the services are performed. This analysis has been rejected by Congress and the
Supreme Court as a basis for detennining worker classification. . .. As a result, a
worker's economic status is inappropriate for use in analyzing worker status.

159

See 29 U.S.C. § 2611 ("employee" has same meaning under FMLA and FLSA); 29 C.F.R. § 1620.8
("Economic reality rather than technical concepts determine whether there is employment within the meaning of EPA.
The common law test based on the power to control the matmer of performance is not applicable to the determination of
whether an employment relationship subject to EPA exists."); Darden, 503 U.S. 326 (distinguishing definition of
"employee" in ERISA from definition in FLSA); Annotation, Determination of "Independent Contractor" and
"Employee" Status for Pwposes of§ 3(e)(l) ofthe Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C.S. § 203(e)(l)), 51 A.L.R. Fed.
702; Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that that Fox was the joint
employer of two unpaid interns for purposes of the FLSA and New York Labor Law minimum wage and overtime
requirements), vacated and remanded, 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2016).
Impmiant recent guidance can be found in Wage & Hour Division Administrator Interpretation No. 2015-1
(July 15, 20 15), which describes the "economic realities" test used to determine employment status under the FLSA. It
asserts that "In applying the economic realities factors, courts have described independent contractors as those workers
with economic independence who are operating a business of their own," and concludes that "The very broad definition
of employment under the FLSA as 'to suffer or permit to work' and the Act's intended expansive coverage for workers
must be considered when applying [those factors]." See also Wage & Hour Division Administrator Interpretation No.
2016-1 (Jan. 20, 2016) (emphasizing the difference between the "economic realities" test and the common law
control test).
160

See generally 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 43 (1997); Annotation,
Right to unemployment compensation or social security of one working on his own projects or activities, 65
A.L.R.2d 1182. See, e.g., Hargrove v. Sleepy's, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 106 A.3d 449 (2015) (applying employeefriendly "ABC" test used under New Jersey's Unemployment Compensation Act to state wage payment and wageand-hour disputes); cf Craig v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 792 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2015) (applying 20factor test used by Kansas Supreme Court that "includes economic reality considerations, while maintaining the
primary focus on an employer's right to control" to wage payment dispute); compare Arnold v. Mutual of Omaha
Ins. Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 213 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (applying "control test" in S.G. Borello & Sons Inc. v.
Department ofIndustrial Ref., 48 Cal. 3d 341 (1989), and rejecting argument that Labor Code provides own
definition of "employee").
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By contrast, the EEOC Enforcement Guidance lists a service-recipient's control over how a
worker performs his job as only one of many factors to be taken into account in making that
determination. 161
The common law test is sometimes interpreted in particular ways based on the perceived
purposes of the act, as well. For example, comis interpreting the NLRA have found an exception
for ce1iain student-employees, 162 and comis interpreting Title VII have found an exception for
volunteers. 163
Relevance of Contract. Language in a contract is not dispositive in determining whether a
worker is an employee or independent contractor for labor law purposes. 164 Nevertheless, a
contract might be relevant in making that determination to the extent it provides evidence of the
parties' intent, the extent to which the service-recipient can control and direct the worker, and
other factors taken into account in making that detmmination.
A contract also can be used to clarify the effect of a worker's status as an employee or
independent contractor. For example, ERISA generally limits pmiicipation in an employee
benefit plan to employees. However, it does not require an employee benefit plan to cover all
employees of an employer. Thus, a contract with a worker generally can provide that the worker,
despite being classified as an employee, may not participate in any of the employee benefit plans
maintained by the employer for its employees. 165 A worker generally also can waive his right to

161

The INS has developed its own definition of"employee" for purposes ofiRCA that is similar but not
identical to the common law test. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1 (j). Neve1theless, plaintiffs might find it difficult to convince a
court to invalidate the definition. See, e.g., NLRB v. Town & Count1y Electric, Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995) (noting
in context ofNLRA that, since the task of defining the term "employee" is one that has been assigned primarily to
the agency created by Congress to administer the Act, the agency's construction of that term is entitled to
"considerable deference").
162

See Brown University, 342 NLRB 483 (2004) (University's relationship with TAs, RAs and proctors
was "primarily educational" and thus they were not employees under the NLRA). But Columbia University, 364
NLRB 90 (Aug. 23, 2016), recently overruled that decision. Compare Berger v. NCAA, 162 F. Supp.3d 845 (S.D.
Ind. 2016) (rejecting a claim that Penn State athletes were employees under the NLRA).
163

See, e.g., Juino, supra note 157. The comt relied on the "threshold-remuneration test" adopted by the
Second, Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, which requires a volunteer to receive enough compensation to
be considered "hired" and to create a situation "that plausibly approximate[s] an employment relationship." The
court felt this was consistent with Darden because "a prerequisite to considering whether an individual is one or the
other under common-law agency principles is that the individual have been hired in the first instance."
164
E.g., Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell &Assocs., MD.'s, P.A., 104 F.3d 1256 (lith Cir. 1997) (ADEA);
Daughtrey v. Honeywell, Inc., 3 F.3d 1488, 1492-93 (11th Cir. 1993) (ERISA).
165

See Laniok v. Advismy Committee, 935 F.2d 1360, 1368 (2d Cir. 1991); Boren v. South-.,vestern Bell
Telephone Co., 933 F.2d 891, 894 (lOth Cir. 1991); Krackow v. Jack Kern Profit Sharing Plan, 2002 WL 31409362
(E.D.N.Y 2002) ("the anti-alienation and anti-assignment provisions are designed to prevent a plan participant fi·om
dissipating his benefits before retirement, not to bar an agreement by tlle employee with the employer to forego
benefits").
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recover under a particular labor law if the waiver is knowing and voluntary and is not
prospective. 166
Relevance of Tax Treatment. The employment status of a worker for tax purposes is
relevant in dete1mining his status for labor law purposes, at least to the extent that his status is
based on the common law test, which applies in both contexts. To the extent that his employment
status for tax purposes is based on Section 530 or some other tax-specific rule, it has little, if any,
relevance.

C.

Identification of Employer

Most federal labor laws apply only to employers and only with respect to their own
employees. There are some exceptions. However, they generally are limited in scope. 167

166

In detennining whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary, comts generally have applied a "totality of
the circumstances" test. E.g., Rivera-Flares v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Caribbean, 112 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1997)
(ADA); Griffin v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 62 F.3d 368, 373 (11th Cir. 1995) (ADEA); Laniok, 935 F.2d at 1368
(ERISA); Bormann v. A. T. & T. Communications, Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 402-03 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 924
(1989) (ADEA). A waiver required as a condition of employment generally is not considered voluntary.
ADEA sets forth minimum standards that a waiver generally must meet in order to be enforceable. 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(£). These standards largely codify prior case law interpreting the !mowing and voluntary standard. Although the
standards do not apply to other labor laws, an employee's waiver of his rights under another labor law is likely to be
enforceable if it meets the standards. See, e.g., Witt01jv. Shell Oil Co., 37 F.3d 1151, 1154 (5th Cir. 1994).
Waivers made in a collective bargaining agreement generally are not enforceable against individual
employees. E.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (Title VII); Allen v. American Home Foods,
Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1553, 1563 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (ERISA); but see Wrightv. Universal Maritime Sen,ice Cmp., 121
F.3d 702 (4th Cir. 1997) (CBA waiver precludes individual ADA suit), rev'd on other grounds, 525 U.S. 70 (1999).
According to the EEOC, a waiver cannot prevent an employee from filing a complaint with the EEOC or assisting
with an EEOC investigation or lawsuit involving that complaint. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, No. 915.002, NonWaivable Rights Under EEOC-Enforced Statutes (April 10, 1997). In addition, under some labor laws, waivers are
subject to significant restrictions or are prohibited altogether. See, e.g., Brooklyn Savings Bank v. 0 'Neil, 324 U.S.
697,704-06 (1945); Mzanbower v. Callicott, 526 F.2d 1183, 1188 (8th Cir. 1975) (FLSA).
But see Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Ratcliff, 141 F.3d 1405 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 873 (1998)
(voluntariness of contract in which worker agrees not to be covered by plan is not an issue precluding summary
judgment since contract is not a waiver of existing rights); compare Laniok v. Brainerd Manufacturing Co. Pension
Plan Advisory Committee, 935 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir. 1991) (waiver of participation in plan required to be knowing and
voluntmy to same extent as waiver of ADEA rights in situation involving alleged age discrimination).
167
29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d) (FLSA) ("employer" generally includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer in relation to an employee), 1002(5) (ERISA) ("employer" means any person acting directly as
an employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an employee benefit plan) & 2611 (4)(A)(ii)
(FMLA) ("employer" includes any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the
employees of such employer, and includes any successor in interest of an employer); 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A) (USERRA)
("employer" generally means any person, institution, organization, or other entity that pays salmy or wages for work
performed or that has control over employment opportunities); 42 U.S. C.§ 2000e-2(b) (Title VII) (prohibiting
employment agency from discriminating against any individual on the basis of his or her race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin); 29 C.P.R. § 1620.8 (EPA) ("employer" means any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest
of an employer in relation to an employee); cf 29 C.P.R. § 1630.6 (prohibiting entity covered by ADA from
entering into contractual arrangements with unrelated patties that have the effect of subjecting the covered entity's
employees to discrimination).
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Multi-Party Arrangements and Affiliated Entities. The same problem of identifying the
employer that arises under the Code arises under most federal labor laws. To resolve this
problem, agencies and courts use some of the same mles that apply for purposes of the Code,
although they derive them from different sources.
Most but not all of the aggregation mles that apply for purposes of the employee benefit
provisions of the Code also apply for purposes of COBRA, Titles I and IV of ERlSA, and the
Medicare secondary payor mles. 168 Other labor laws contain no specific aggregation mles.
Instead, agencies and courts interpreting those laws use the common law "single employer" mle.
That rule treats two or more entities as a single employer if they are closely integrated based on
all of the facts and circumstances. 169
As noted above, under the common law two or more entities may be treated as an
employee's "joint employer" if they share control over the employee. Although this mle applies
for federal tax purposes, it has been used very little in that context. By contrast, agencies and
courts interpreting federal labor laws frequently use the mle in multi-pmty situations to treat the
leasing company or broker and its client as employers of an employee, and therefore accountable
for any violations of those laws involving the employee, whether or not they are directly
responsible for the violations. 170 The DOL's Wage and Hour Division, interpreting the FLSA, 171

168

E.g., ERISA§§ 3(40)(B)(iii) & 400l(b)(14)(B) (generally adopting the controlled group mles in the
Code for purposes ofTitles I and IV); Code§ 5000(b)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § l395y(b)(l)(E)(i); 42 C.F.R. § 4ll.l06(d)
(generally adopting the controlled group rules in the Code for purposes ofthe Medicare secondary payor rules).
169

See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. 639.3(a)(2) (WARN Act); Radio Union v. Broadcast Service ofMobile, Inc., 380 U.S.
255, 256 (1965) (NLRA); Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 993-96 (6th Cir. 1997), (ADA
and ADEA); Cookv. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., 69 F.3d 1235, 1240-41 (2d Cir. 1995); McKenzie v. Davenport Harris
Funeral Home, 834 F.2d 930,933-34 (11th Cir. 1987) (Title VII); NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117,
1122 (3d Cir. 1982) (NLRA); see generally K. Strasser, The Law of Corporate Groups: Statutory' Law-General, Part
IV (1989); K. Strasser, The Law ofCmporate Groups: Statutmy Lmv---States, Chapter 16 (1995); EEOC Compliance
Manual Section 605, Appendix G; cf 29 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2) (control test for purposes ofWARN Act).
170
See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 791.2 (FLSA) & 825.106 (FMLA); Boire v. Greyhound Cmp., 376 U.S. 473,481
(1964); NLRB v. Western Tempormy Services, Inc., 821 F.2d 1258, 1266-67 (7th Cir. 1987) (NLRA); Magnuson v.
Peak Technical Services, 808 F. Supp. 500, 507-10 (E.D. Va. 1992) (Title VII); see generally EEOC Compliance
Manual Section 605, Appendix G; Lenz, Co-Employment-A Review of Customer Liability Issues in the Staffing
Sen,ices Indust1y, 10 The Labor Lawyer 195, 196-99 (1994); Annotation, When are separate business entities "joint
employers" of the same employeesforpwposes of the application offederal labor laws, 73 A.L.R. Fed. 609.

Federal labor laws generally contain no mles comparable to the leased employee mles that apply for
purposes of the employee benefit provisions of the Code. The common law "bonowed servant" mle can be applied
to much the same effect. See Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 227 (1958). However, so far it has not been. See,
e.g., Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Cmp., 33 F.3d 498, 505 (5th Cir. 1994) (Title VII).
171

See Wage & Hour Division Administrator's Interpretation No. 2016-l (Jan. 20, 2016), which "provides
guidance on identifying those scenarios in which two or more employers jointly employ an employee and are thus
jointly liable for compliance under the FLSA or MSPA [i.e., the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Act]," but also emphasizes the difference between the "economic realities" test and the common law
control test.
34
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the NLRB, interpreting the NLRA, 172 and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
interpreting the OSHA, 173 have been particularly aggressive.
Finally, the EEOC and some courts aggressively interpret some labor laws to apply to
employers with respect to individuals employed by other entities, if they employ the requisite
number of employees to be considered "employers" under those laws and exercise control over
one or more aspects of the employees' employment. 174 The EEOC refers to this interpretation as
the "third party interference" doctrine, and uses it and the joint employer rule to conclude that, in
most circumstances, a leasing company or broker is accountable for violations of federal labor
laws perpetrated by its clients, and vice versa. 175

IV.

ESTABLISHING THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR RELATIONSHIP
A.

Relevance of Contract

As noted above, language in a contract is not dispositive in dete1mining whether a worker
is an employee or independent contractor for federal tax purposes, but might be relevant in
making that determination to the extent it provides evidence of the parties' intent, the extent to
which the service-recipient can control and direct the worker, and other factors taken into
account in making that determination, and can be used to clarify the effect of a worker's status as
an employee or independent contractor.

B.

Form SS-8 Determinations

Since the parties cannot simply decide between themselves whether a worker is an
employee or independent contractor, other methods have developed to help make that
dete1mination. The principal one is to apply for a dete1mination from the IRS on Fmm SS-8. The
application can be filed by either the worker or the service-recipient. If the worker asks for the
172

See Browning-Ferris Indus. of California Inc. v. Sanitm)' Truck Drivers and Helpers Local 350, No. 32RC-109684 (Aug. 27, 2015), which held that a company can be viewed as a single joint employer with its contractor
under the NLRA even if it hasn't exercised any overt control over the workers. The NLRB explained that "Reserved
authority to control terms and conditions of employment, even if not exercised, is clearly relevant to the jointemployment inquiry," citing Restatement (Second) of Agency§§ 2(1) & 220(1).
173

An undated draft OSHA internal memorandum obtained by FOIA request in August 2015 advises
investigators that "a joint employer standard may apply where the corporate entity exercises direct or indirect
control over working conditions, has the unexercised potential to control working conditions or based on the
economic realities. As a general matter, two entities will be determined to be joint employers when they share or
codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment and the putative joint
employer meaningfully affects the matters relating to the employment relationship such as hiring, firing, discipline,
supervision and direction.
174

E.g., Cmparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesalers Assoc. ofNew England, 37 F.3d 12,
17 (1st Cir. 1994) (ADA); Spirt v. TIAA, 691 F.2d 1054, 1063 (2d Cir. 1982); vacated and rem 'don other grounds,
863 U.S. 1223 (1983); Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Title VII); EEOC
Compliance Manual Section 605, Appendix F; EEOC Enforcement Guidance notes 17, 20; contra Allen v. Cub
Foods Cmp., 1997 WL 566365 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (citing EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th
Cir. 1995)) (ADA).
175
This view is not universally accepted. See, e.g., Williams v. Caruso, 966 F. Supp. 287, 296 (D. Del.
1997); Astrmvsky v. First Portland Mortgage Corp., 887 F. Supp. 332,336 (D. Me. 1995).
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dete1mination, both the worker and the service-recipient are entitled to the dete1mination. If the
service-recipient asks for the dete1mination, only it is entitled to the dete1mination. As part of the
application process, the IRS will contact the non-filing party for its version of the facts that are
relevant to the application. The IRS may contact the filing party for additional information. The
IRS generally makes a dete1mination with respect to an application within several months. There
is no fee for filing a Form SS-8. There is no appeal from an adverse determination. However, the
filer may request a reconsideration if there are additional facts that were not considered, and the
filer may withdraw the application at any time prior to the IRS signing the determination letter.
The application is filed with the District Director for the Jmisdiction in which the servicerecipient is located. A dete1mination based on Fmm SS-8 is only binding on the IRS, so its
relevance is limited to actions initiated by the IRS.
Notice 989 (rev. July 2009) provides guidance on what a worker should do when the IRS
reclassifies the worker from an independent contractor to an employee.
State unemployment insurance agencies often make similar detenninations in the course
of dete1mining whether a worker is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Although they
apply only for that purpose, they can raise issues in the tax or other areas.

V.

DISPUTES CONCERNING INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR RELATIONSHIP
A.

Government Audits, Litigation and Sanctions
1.

Audits and Litigation

Even though the treatment of employees and independent contractors is essentially taxneutral, the IRS has historically wonied that independent contractors are, as a group, less taxcompliant than employees, largely because of the lack of mandatory withholding. Over the years
many estimates of the "tax gap" attributable to misclassification have been made, some of which
are frankly enormous. However, as the Congressional Research Service observed in a recent
report, "[a]ccurate data on the cunent size of the tax gap caused by misclassification are
unavailable. Furthermore, the magnitude of many effects of improved classification are [sic]
unavailable or inherently subjective. With the current state of knowledge, whether or not the
benefits of curtailing misclassification of workers outweigh the costs is a value judgment." 176
Despite this uncertainty, the IRS is, if anything, pursuing misclassification issues on audit
more vigorously now than at any time in the past. In a 2008 speech an IRS official stated that
30% of IRS audits in that year were expected to be based on employee classification issues, 177

176

Tax Gap: Misc/assification of Employees as Independent Contractors (CRS, March 25, 2010). In an
October 13, 2011, letter to the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, House Education and the Workforce
Committee Democrats said that ending employee misclassification could raise revenue, citing a 2010 Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration ("TIGTA") report that estimated a $54 billion tax gap for employment
underreporting. However, TIGTA's report actually found that the available data was old, that new data would not be
available for several years, and that in any event the IRS's sample size was too small.
177

See BNA Daily Report for Executives, May 16, 2008, at G-4 (remarks of John Tuzynsld).
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typically questioning whether the service-recipient has properly characterized workers as
independent contractors.
The IRS primarily identifies employers to examine for potential misclassification through
four sources: (1) the Determination ofWorker Status (Form SS-8) Program, described above, 178
(2) the Employment Tax Examination Program ("ETEP"), in which IRS uses specific criteria to
identify for examination employers that have a high likelihood of having misclassified
employees, such as reporting a relatively high percentage of compensation to workers on Form
1099-MISC, 179 (3) general employment tax examinations, 180 and (4) the Questionable
Employment Tax Practices ("QETP") program, through which the IRS and states share
infmmation on worker classification-related examinations and other employment tax issues. 181
Other federal and state govermnent agencies have become more active, as well. As noted
above, the QETP is a collaboration between the IRS and the states. The DOL, particularly its
Wage and Hour Division (WHD), also has become particularly active in pursuing employee
misclassification cases, often in conjunction with state authorities. 182 The DOL's FY 2014-2018
Strategic Plan targets misclassification as a top priority. The WHD is representing the DOL on a
joint DOL-Department of Treasury initiative to deter misclassification. This enforcement focus
might eventually be picked up by other agencies within the DOL, such as the Employee Benefit
Security Administration, and cause it to pursue or support suits against employers and insurance
companies demanding employee benefits for individuals misclassified as independent
contractors. At an ABA meeting on May 10, 2013, an IRS official (John Tuzynski) stated that
the IRS intends to increase the number of worker classification cases that will be sent through the
questionable employment tax program (QETP) as soon as it finishes an agency-wide national
178

In fiscal year 2008, 72% of all Fonn SS-8 requests resulted in IRS determinations that the workers in
question were employees, 25% were closed without any advice given, and 3% resulted in IRS determinations that
the workers in question were independent contractors. However, most employers determined to have misclassified
employees under the Form SS-8 Program are very small businesses, which generally are not referred to audit
because examining such businesses is generally not cost effective. As a result, for recent tax years, only about 2-3%
of the employers it identified to have misclassified employees through the Form SS-8 Program were referred for
examination, and an even smaller percentage resulted in examinations.
179

The IRS examines about 1-3% of the employers it identifies annually through ETEP to have potentially
misclassified employees. For tax year 2006, IRS identified over 33,000 employers through ETEP.
180

58% of the misclassification-related examinations of employers that SB/SE conducted in fiscal year
2008 arose through the course of IRS examining employers for other types of employment tax noncompliance.
181

Although IRS may not share individual taxpayer information gleaned from tax returns with the DOL, it
may share such information with the states. At the ABA Tax Section meeting on May 10,2013, John Tuzynski, head
ofiRS employment tax policy, said that the IRS intends to increase the number of worker classification cases that
will be sent through the questionable employment tax program (QETP) as soon as it finishes an agency-wide
national research project. The research project involves an inventory of more than 6,000 audit cases over a threeyear period. He also said that many audit cases relating to worker classification are being reported through IRS's
whistleblower program.
182

Wage and Hour Division Press Release Number 13-2180-NAT (Nov. 18, 2013) announces that the
DOL's Wage and Hour Division, the New York State Labor Department and the New York State Attorney General
have signed "memoranda of understanding to protect the rights of employees by preventing their misclassification as
independent contractors or other nonemployee statuses."
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research project. That research project involves an inventmy of more than 6,000 audit cases over
a three-year period. He also said that many audit cases relating to worker classification are being
reported through IRS's whistleblower program.
Audits involving employment classification issues, and any resulting litigation, generally
are subject to the same rules as other audits and litigation, except for the following special rules:
•

The burden of proof can shift to the IRS in some cases. As noted above, if a taxpayer
establishes a prima facie case that it was reasonable not to treat a worker as an employee
in a Section 530 case, and the taxpayer cooperates with reasonable IRS requests, the
burden of proof in the case generally shifts to the IRS. 183

•

The taxpayer has access to three special settlement programs:

+ The Classification Settlement Program ("CSP") generally is available for any
businesses with open employment tax cases that have filed Forms 1099-MISC with
respect to the workers at issue, i.e., met the reporting consistency requirement of
Section 530. 184 Using the CSP can avoid costly, time-consuming and adversarial
appeals and litigation. Under the CSP, if the business met the reporting consistency
requirement and had a colorable argument that it met the substantive consistency and
reasonable basis requirements of Section 530, the IRS will offer an assessment of 25%
of the employment tax liability othmwise due for the audit year. The CSP is not
available to determine which business is the proper employer in multi-party situations.

+ The Early Refenal to Appeals Program is available if the examiner and the taxpayer
cannot agree on one or more employment tax issues after the issues have been
developed. It allows the taxpayer to request an immediate meeting with an IRS
Appeals officer to resolve the employment tax issues, provided that, among other
things, (a) resolving the issues quickly can reasonably be expected to result in a
quicker resolution of the entire case and (b) the other issues in the case are not
expected to be completed before Appeals can resolve the early refenal issue. 185

+ Fast Track Mediation ("FTM") is available under similar circumstances, but gives the
IRS and the taxpayer access to an IRS mediator to tly to resolve any unagreed
employment tax issues. The mediator facilitates the discussion but cannot impose

183

Other similar mles that might apply in employment classification disputes are (I) Code § 7430(c)(4)(B),
which creates a presumption, for purposes of determining whether an award oflitigation costs to the U.S. is
permitted under that section, that the IRS's position is not substantially justified if it does not follow its own
published guidance (including private letter mlings, technical advice memoranda and determination letters) and (2)
Code§ 7491, which shifts the burden of proof in litigation to the IRS on any factual issue relevant in determining
liability for income taxes (not employment taxes) once the taxpayer has introduced credible evidence.
184

See generally Internal Revenue Manual (Examinations)'\['\[ 4.23.6.1 et seq.

185

Rev. Proc. 99-28, § 4 (employment tax early referral procedures), 1999-29 I.R.B. 109; see also Code

§ 7123.
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resolution. The IRS and the taxpayer must agree on any resolution. Issues not resolved
can follow the nonnal appeal process. 186
• Unlike other controversies involving employment tax issues, before the IRS can assess the
proposed employment taxes resulting from a reclassification of a worker as an employee
or a determination that the worker is not eligible for Section 530, the taxpayer must be
given a chance to petition the Tax Court to review the IRS's determination and the proper
amount of employment taxes due under the determination. 187
In 2011 the IRS announced a new Voluntaty Classification Settlement Program
("VCSP"). 188 Under the VCSP (1) an employer will agree to treat a class of workers as
employees for future tax periods, and (2) in exchange, the employer (a) will pay 10% of the
employment tax liability that would have been due on compensation paid to the workers for the
most recent tax year if they had been employees, using the reduced rates of Section 3509, but (b)
will not be liable for any interest and penalties on the liability, and (c) will not be subject to an
employment tax audit with respect to the worker classification of the workers for prior years. The
program is available only if the employer has consistently treated the workers as non-employees
and filed all required Form 1099-MISC for the workers for the previous three years. 189 Unlike
the current CSP, the VCSP is available only if the employer is not under an employment tax
audit by the IRS, under audit concerning the classification of the workers by the DOL or by a
state government agency, or contesting in court the classification of workers from a previous IRS
or Department of Labor audit. Patiicipation in the program is low but increasing.

186
See IRS Publication 3605, Fast Track Mediation: A Process for Prompt Resolution of Tax Issues (Rev.
Sept. 2002); see also Code§ 7123.
187

Code § 7436; see American Airlines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 144 T.C. 24 (20 15) (listing four
requirements needed for Tax Court to have jurisdiction under Code§ 7436(a)); Notice 2002-5, 2002-3 I.R.B. 320;
IRS Publication 3953, Questions and Answers About Tax Court Proceedings for Determination ofEmployment
Status Under I.R.C. § 7436 (Rev. Jan. 2002); Chief Counsel Notice CC-2001-044 (Oct. 4, 2001). B G Painting Inc.
v. Comm 'r, T.C. Memo. 2016-62 (Apri15, 2016), held that the Form SS-8 process is voluntary and is not an "audit"
or "examination" for purposes of Code § 7436(a), and therefore the court does not have jurisdiction to hear a
challenge to a Fon11 SS-8 determination.
Chief Counsel Notice CC-2016-002, Change in Litigation Position Regarding Section 7436 Tax Court
Jurisdiction (Dec. 17, 20 15), superseded Chief Counsel Notice CC-20 14-011 (renumbered CC-20 15-001 ), and
instructed IRS attorneys no longer to argue that a Notice of Determination of Worker Classification (NDWC) is a
prerequisite to Tax Court jurisdiction under Code§ 7436 provided certain other requirements are met.
188
See Ann. 2011-64, 2011-411.R.B. 503, as modified by Ann. 2012-45,2012-51 I.R.B. 724, and Ann.
2012-46, 2012-5li.R.B. 725. Extensive FAQs are available on the IRS web site. According to IRS officials, the IRS
has told states that VCSP results will not be shared with them.
189

However, in a speech on November 17, 2011, an IRS official said that the IRS will view Form 1099s
filed within six months of their due dates as acceptable for this purpose.

39

© 2016 Kurt L.P. Lawson

2.

Sanctions

When an employee is misclassified as an independent contractor, the consequences to the
employer can be severe:
• If the misclassification is intentional, the service-recipient could owe 100% of any FUTA
tax, FICA taxes, and required income tax withholding on the worker's earnings. 190 The
service-recipient will be entitled to a credit for any income taxes and self-employment
taxes that the worker certifies that he paid on Form 4669, 191 and might be able to recover
the income taxes and employee share of FICA taxes that it is required to pay from the
worker. However, the employer is not thereby relieved "from liability for any penalties or
additions to the tax othetwise applicable in respect of such failure to deduct and
withhold." 192
• If the misclassification is unintentional, the service-recipient will owe 100% of any FUTA
tax on the worker's earnings, 100% of the employer share ofFICA taxes on the earnings,
20% of the employee share of FICA taxes on the earnings (i.e., 1.53%), plus income tax
withholding equal to 1.5% of the earnings. 193 If the service-recipient did not file Forms
1099-MISC for the worker other than for reasonable cause, the latter percentages increase
to 40% (i.e., 3.06%) and 3% respectively. 194 These percentages are based on IRS
estimates of the taxes lost as a result of misclassification. The worker's liability is not
affected by the service-recipient's payment of taxes, the service-recipient cannot recover
either the employee share of FICA taxes or the income tax withholding fi:om the worker,
and the service-recipient is not entitled to a credit for any taxes paid by the worker. 195

190

An employer who is required to deduct and withhold income tax under Code § 3402 "is liable for the
payment of such tax whether or not it is collected from the employee by the employer." Treas. Reg. § 31.3403-1.
191

Code§§ 3402(d) & 6521; cf SBSE-04-1108-064, Interim Guidance onlRC 3402(d) Relief in an
Examination (Nov. 25, 2008). If the worker paid self-employment taxes on the earnings, he might be entitled to a
refund of the amount he paid in excess of the employee's share of FICA taxes. See Rev. Rul. 86-111, 1986-2 C.B.
176; Rev. Proc. 85-18, § 3.08, 1985-1 C.B. 5.08. A misclassified employee who has not paid self-employment taxes
on the earnings can File Form 8919 (Uncollected Social Security and Medicare Tax on Wages) to repmt and pay the
employee share of FICA taxes and get social security credit for his earnings. Before 2007, employees used Form
413 7 (Social Security and Medicare Tax on Umeported Tip Income) for this purpose.
192

Code§ 3402(d).

193

Code § 3509(a).

194

Code§ 3509(b).

195

Code§ 3509(d). By its tenns, Code§ 3509(d) is mandatory, even if taking a credit for taxes paid by the
employee would produce a better result. See SBSE-04-0709-039, Officer Compensation: IRC Sections 3509 and
7436, and Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 (July 6, 2009) ("The tax rates under IRC Section 3509 are required
to be used in all reclassification cases unless there has been intentional disregard to treat the worker as an
employee."); FSA 483 (published in BNA Daily Tax Repmt, Thursday, October 8, 1998) ("[W]e reiterate that it is the
position of this office that section 3509 of the Code is a mandatory provision and that the taxpayer does not have the
option to apply sections 3402(d) or 6521 to determine employment tax liability in lieu ofsection3509."). CCA ILM
200825043, Voluntary Compliance under Sections 3509 and 6205 (May 13, 2008), concludes that employers (i) may
use Code § 3509 rates, if that section applies, to determine their tax liability attributable to worker reclassification
following receipt of a Form SS-8 determination letter from the IRS, but only for wages paid in prior years, (ii) may
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• In either event, the employer could be liable for interest and penalties. The penalties could
include the accuracy-related penalty (if the underpayments are due to negligence or
disregard of mles or regulations or substantial understatements of income tax), 196 the
failure-to-deposit penalty on the employer share of FICA taxes, 197 the failure-to-file
penalty (if inaccurate or no employment tax returns such as Form 941 are filed), 198 and the
information-reporting penalties (if inaccurate or no infonnation returns such as Form W-2
are filed and provided to employees). 199 Interest would be due from the due date of the

use Treas. Reg. § 31.6205-1(c)(2) to obtain an interest-fi·ee adjustment of federal income tax withholding for wages
paid in prior calendar years when they make adjustments using Code § 3509 rates despite the general rule against
such adjustments. If liability is determined under Code § 3509, penalties are determined on the same basis. Prop.
Treas. Reg.§ 31.3509-1(d)(6).
196
Code § 6662. The penalty equals 20% of the "underpayment," as defined in Code § 6664, of amounts
required to be shown on a return if due to negligence or a "substantial understatement" of income tax. The IRS takes
the position that the accuracy-related penalty applies to underpayments of employment taxes, including
underpayments of income tax withholding. E.g., TAM 200214001 (Oct. 19, 2001). Abbey Cmpet Co. v. United
States, 97-2 U.S.T.C. ~ 50,740 (Fed. Cl. 1997), agreed with the IRS that an employer that negligently failed to
withhold the required amount of income taxes from an employee's wages, and to declare the underpayment on Form
941, was liable for the Code § 6662 penalty.
197

Code§ 6656 provides that, in case of failure by any person to make a timely deposit of tax imposed
under the Code, unless the failure is due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect, there shall be imposed on
such person a penalty equal to the applicable percentage of the amount of the underpayment. The applicable
percentage increases from 2% if the failure is for not more than 5 days, to 5% if the failure is for 6-15 days, and to
10% if the failure is for more than 15 days. It increases to 15% if the tax is not deposited on or before the earlier of
(i) 10 days after the person receives a delinquency notice from the IRS or (ii) the day on which the person receives a
notice and demand for immediate payment fi·om the IRS. In Rev. Rul. 75-191, 1975-1 C.B. 376, the IRS concluded
that the failure-to-deposit penalty does not apply in case offailure to deposit income taxes and the employee portion
of FICA taxes that should have been withheld from compensation paid to employees, but that were not withheld.
Like other penalties, the failure-to-deposit penalty does not apply if the taxpayer had reasonable cause for
the failure. CCA 201414017 (Jan. 16, 2014) concluded that an employer was not entitled to the reasonable cause
defense to the Code § 6656 failure-to-deposit penalty where its "claim to the reasonable cause defense [rested]
primarily upon its reliance on a third-party payroll processing company to make the deposits," because the defense
"requires the taxpayer to demonstrate that[,] despite its exercise of ordinary business care and prudence, it was
'rendered unable to meet its responsibilities," and the employer's "reliance on a faulty system that led to the
untimely deposits did not render it unable to meet its filing responsibilities."
198

The penalty equals 5% of the amount due for failure to file an employment tax return. If the failure
extends past a month, 5% is added for each additional month, up to 25%, with a minimum penalty of 100% of the
tax or $100 (whichever is less) if the failure lasts for 60 days. In e-mailed advice dated March 30,2012, the IRS
confirmed that the failure-to-file penalty in Code § 6651(a)(l) can apply to a failure to file Form 945, Annual Return
of Withheld Federal Income Tax. The advice responded to a request for guidance fi·om the field "regarding how to
protect the interests of the government in a worker classification case." Exam had concluded that an employer had
misclassified workers as independent contractors. It was suggested that, as an alternative, the employer could be
penalized for failing to obtain the workers' SSNs, resulting in a backup withholding obligation.
199

Code§§ 6721 (for failure to file information return on time or to include all of the information required
to be shown on the return or the inclusion of incorrect information) & 6722 (parallel penalties for failures relating to
statements required to be provided to employees). The penalties generally are $260 for each incorrect, incomplete or
untimely Form W-2 or 1099-MISC, which is increased to 10% of the amount that is not correctly reported ifthe
failure is due to "intentional disregard" of the correct information reporting requirement.
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Fonn 941 for the relevant quarter, 200 unless the underpayments are corrected in a timely
manner. 201
• Congress has enacted two provisions specifically to address criminal employment tax
issues. Section 7202 provides that any person required collect, account for, and pay over
employment taxes and willfully fails to do so "shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs
of prosecution." Section 7215 provides that if the facts are the same but there was a
reasonable doubt as to whether the law required collection of tax, or who was required to
collect tax, the individual "shall ... be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both, together with the costs ofprosecution."202
• Section 7201 also makes an "attempt" to "evade or defeat any tax" a felony punishable by
five years in prison and a $100,000 fine (for individuals). Section 7206 also punishes the
"making" or "subscribing" of any retum which is not believed to be "ttue and conect as to
every material fact" or to otherwise engage in fraudulent conduct generally involving the
tax system as a felony canying three years imprisonment and a $100,000 fine.
• A reclassified worker might also be entitled to benefits under the service-recipient's
employee benefit plans (if reclassified workers are not specifically excluded or by law

200

Rev. Proc. 60-17, 1960-2 C.B. 942; Rev. Proc. 84-66, 1984-2 C.B. 637.

201

See Code§ 6205 and the regulations thereunder. Beginning in 2009, adjustments must be repmted on an
adjusted return for the return period when the wages were paid rather than on the employer's employment tax return
for the period when the error is asce1tained. See T.D. 9405, 73 Fed. Reg. 37371 (July 1, 2008). Thus, for example,
new Form 941-X must be used in lieu of old Form 941c to correct errors on a previously filed Form 941 if the error
is discovered after December 31, 2008. New Form 941-X also will be used by employers instead of Form 843 for
refunds or abatements of over-repmted employment taxes.
Cf CCA 200846022 (Oct. 6, 2008) (if an employer makes an enor that results in the underpayment of taxes
associated with employee wages or compensation, an interest-free adjustment under Code§ 6205 should not be
denied solely because the accuracy-related penalty is imposed under Code § 6662(b )(1 ); CCA 200825043(May 13,
2008) (employer paying at reduced rates under Code§ 3509 is still eligible for Code§ 6205 interest-free adjustment
treatment on those ammmts); SBSE-04-0108-004 (Jan. 9, 2008) ("To be entirely interest-free, full payment of the
underpayment adjustment must be made on or before the due date of the return for the return period in which the
enor was asce1tained, e.g., the return period in which the Form 2504 or Form 2504-WC are signed. If the tax
adjustment is not paid when due, interest will begin accruing on the day following the due date of the return for that
period.").
202
See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3557 & 3571, potentially increasing these amounts significantly. Cf United States
v. McLain, 646 F.3d 599 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1763 (2012) (upholding conviction, under Code
§ 7202, of owner and operator of temporary staffing agency for nurses for failing to account for and pay
employment taxes, despite argument that he held good faith belief that nurses were independent conh·actors and thus
did not have the requisite mens rea).
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may not be excluded), and in any event will have to be taken into account when the
service-recipient runs nondiscrimination tests with respect to those plans. 203
Any IRS assessment generally must be made within the three-year statute of limitations, but if no
employment tax retums were filed then no statute of limitations applies. 204 If the assessment is
paid, the taxpayer must file a refund suit within two years after the date of payment. 205
Employment taxes are "divisible taxes," generally permitting a refund suit where the taxpayer
pays the tax assessed for one employee for one quarter. 206
The service-provider could also be subject to sanctions for misreporting his income, for
example if he knew his employer was failing to report taxable wages to him on his Fonn W-2. 207
State sanctions are possible, as well, under state tax or labor laws. In 2012 a Califomia
law went into effect which makes it unlawful to willfully misclassify workers as independent
contractors and imposes fines of up to $15,000 per violation ($25,000 ifthere is "a pattem or
practice of these violations") for doing so. The law defines willful misclassification as "avoiding
employee status for an individual by voluntarily and knowingly misclassifying that individual as
an independent contractor." The State government has the authority to assess fines and liquidated
damages. In addition, individuals can file complaints with the State, asking for a determination
that an employer has misclassified them.
B.

Private Litigation

A worker can challenge a service-recipient's classification of him as an employee or
independent contractor for employment tax purposes by filing a Form SS-8, as described above.
A worker can challenge a service-recipient's classification ofhim as an employee or independent
contractor for purposes any benefits that depend on that classification by filing a claim for those
benefits. 208 Some kinds of employee benefits are required to be provided to all common-law
employees (usually subject to certain limited exceptions), although the IRS allows the most
valuable kind of benefit-tax-qualified retirement plans-to exclude workers whom the servicerecipient does not treat as employees for employment tax purposes, even if a court or

203
In Kenney v. Comm 'r, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 614 (1995), a retirement plan was disqualified for failing to
benefit a sufficient number of nonhighly compensated employees as a result of mischaracterizing workers as
independent contractors.
204
Code § 6501 (a). The period generally begins running on April15 of the following year. See Code
§ 6501(b)(2).
205

Code § 6511.

206

See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960).

207
See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b) ("A taxpayer's reliance on erroneous information repmied on a Form W2, Form 1099, or other information return indicates reasonable cause and good faith, provided the taxpayer did not
know or have reason to know that the information was incorrect.").
208

See, e.g., Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 154 Cal.App.4th 1, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 327 (2nd
District 2007) (FedEx drivers were employees not independent contractors purpose of their entitlement to
reimbursement for work-related expenses).
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administrative agency dete1mines that such individuals are common law employees and not
independent contractors. 209
There is little case law to support a private right of action against an employer for failing
to withhold the coiTect amount of income or employment taxes. 210 However, employees have
sometimes prevailed when they have been able to recharacterize the lawsuit as one based on tort
or contract. 211

209
See, e.g., TAM (unreleased) (July 28, 1999). Courts generally agree. See, e.g., CunJ' v. CTB McGraw
Hill, LLC, 37 E.B.C. 2390 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Administrative Committee of the Time Warner, Inc. Benefit Plans v.
Biscardi, 25 E.B.C. 2325(S.D.N.Y 2000) (plan administrator could interpret "regular employee" to exclude workers
designated as independent contractors).
210
See, e.g., Ford v. Troyer, 25 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. La. 1998) (employee had no implied private right of
action for failure to withhold federal income taxes); Ednacot v. MESA Medical Group PLLC, 2014 WL 2527095
(E.D. Ky., June 4, 2014), aff'd, 790 F.3d 636 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 243 (2015) (employee's claims that
her employer improperly withheld FICA taxes fi·om her wages "must be dismissed" because "FICA does not
provide a private right of action").

211
See, e.g., Clemens v. USV Pharmaceutical, 838 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1988); Childers v. NY. &
Presbyterian Hasp., 36 F. Supp.3d 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Davidson v. Henkel Co1p., 2015 WL 74257 (E.D. Mich.,
Jan. 6, 2015).
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TABLE A
FACTORS TRADITIONALLY USED BY
IRS AND SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
TO DETERMINE EMPLOYMENT STATUS
UNDER COMMON LAW TEST
1.

The worker must comply with employer's instructions about the work.

2.

The worker receives training from or at the direction of the employer.

3.

The worker provides services that are integrated into the business of the employer.

4.

The worker provides services that must be rendered personally.

5.

The worker hires, supervises, and pays assistants for the employer.

6.

The worker has a continuing working relationship with the employer.

7.

The worker must follow set hours of work.

8.

The worker works full-time for an employer.

9.

The worker does his work on the employer's premises.

10.

The worker must do his work in a sequence set by the employer.

11.

The worker must submit regular reports to the employer.

12.

The worker receives payments of regular amounts at set intervals.

13.

The worker receives payments for business and/or traveling expenses.

14.

The worker relies on the employer to finnish tools and materials.

15.

The worker lacks a major investment in facilities used to perform the service.

16.

The worker cannot make a profit or suffer a loss from his services.

17.

The worker works for one employer at a time.

18.

The worker does not offer his services to the general public.

19.

The worker can be fired by the employer.

20.

The worker may quit work at any time without incurring liability.
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TABLEB
NEWER APPROACH USED BY IRS TO
DETERMINE WHETHER A WORKER IS AN EMPLOYEE
Category

Examples of Factors
Included in Category

Behavioral Control, i.e., the
right to direct or control how the
worker performs the specific
task for which he or she is
engaged

Whether the worker must
comply with the servicerecipient's instructions about the
work
Whether the instructions are
detailed and communicated
directly by the service-recipient
Whether the worker receives
training from or at the direction
of the service-recipient

Analogous Factors from
Traditional20-Factor Test
Whether the worker must
comply with the employer's
instructions about the work (1)
Whether the worker receives
training from or at the direction
of the employer (2)
Whether the worker must submit
regular repmts to the employer
(11)
Whether the worker hires,
supervises, and pays assistants
for the employer (5)
Whether the worker must do his
work in a sequence set by the
employer (1 0)

Financial Control, i.e., the right
to direct or control how the
business aspects of the workers
activities are conducted

Whether the worker has a
significant investment in
equipment, etc.

Whether the worker receives
payments of regular amounts at
set intervals (12)

Whether the worker incurs
significant umeimbursed
expenses

Whether the worker receives
payments for business and/or
traveling expenses (13)

Whether the worker is free to
seek out other business
oppmtunities

Whether the worker relies on the
employer to furnish tools and
materials (14)

Whether the worker is paid a
salary or hourly wage rather
than a flat fee

Whether the worker lacks a
major investment in facilities
used to perform the service (15)

Whether the worker has the
ability to realize a profit or loss
(the preceding facts are relevant
in making this determination)

Whether the worker cmmot
make a profit or suffer a loss
from his services (16)
Whether the worker does not
offer his services to the general
public (18)
Whether the worker provides
services that are integrated into
the business of the employer (3)
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Category

Examples of Factors
Included in Category

Analogous Factors from
Traditional20-Factor Test

Whether the worker provides
services that must be rendered
personally (4)
Relationship of Parties, i.e., how
the parties perceive their
relationship

Whether the worker is described
as an employee in a contract
with the service-recipient

Whether the worker has a
continuing working relationship
with the employer (6)

Whether the worker receives a
Form W-2 from the servicerecipient

Whether the worker can be fired
by the employer (19)

Whether the worker is treated as
an employee for employee
benefit purposes

Whether the worker may quit
work at any time without
incurring liability (20)

Whether each party can
terminate the arrangement at
will, without penalty
Whether the worker's
relationship with the servicerecipient is of indefinite duration
Whether the services provided
by the worker are a key aspect
of the service-recipient's regular
business activity
Less Relevant Factors

Whether the worker is told when
to work by the service-recipient

Whether the worker must follow
set hours of work (7)

Whether the worker works on a
full-time basis for the servicerecipient

Whether the worker works fulltime for an employer (8)

Whether the worker works on
the business premises of the
service-recipient
Whether the worker works at
only one location
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Whether the worker does his
work on the employer's
premises (9)
Whether the worker works for
one employer at a time ( 17)

